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This research was undertaken to perform analysis for alternative acquisition
strategies for the Turkish Armed Forces. The main purposes were to determine
advantages and disadvantages of each acquisition strategy and to find out the most
promising acquisition strategy for the Turkish Armed Forces.
Four acquisition strategies were discussed in the thesis with the emphasis on life
cycle support. While each acquisition strategy has its own advantages and
disadvantages, coproduction is shown to be the most promising acquisition strategy for
Turkey. However, it is further shown that the advantages and disadvantages of each
acquisition strategy strongly depends on the conditions of bidders' proposals and
specialties of the system to be selected.
The thesis concluded by presenting recommendations and a rating matrix for
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
Turkey occupies one of the most strategically important locations in the world.
Turkey can be seen as a gateway between West and East. It is at the intersection of
three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa, and has borders on three different seas. The
Turkish Straits connect the Black Sea with the Aegean and the Mediterranean. The
European part of Turkey lies in the Balkans, whereas Anatolia, the Turkish heartland,
is adjacent to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area, near the main energy source
of the world [Ref 1]. Turkey is located directly between Europe and Asia. Nearly one-
half of its 2620 km (1628 miles) of land frontier is with European states - Greece,
Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R.; and the remainder with Iran, Iraq and Syria [Ref. 2].
The original Turks came from Central Asia. The name "Turk" first appeared in
written historical records in the sixth century AD, when Chinese annals speak of a
powerful empire in Central Asia, founded by a steppe people called Tu-Kiu. It is from
this state that the oldest surviving Turkish inscriptions have come. At the beginning of
the 11th century the Turks conquered Anatolia [Ref. 2|. In 1299, after the decline of
Selcuk's (Seljuqs) Empire, the Ottoman Empire was established. It extended from
Hungary, and included the entire Balkan Peninsula, Crimean Island, and the whole of
North Africa to include Egypt and the Middle East [Ref ij.
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 the Turkish Republic was
established . Today, Turkey maintains the second largest armed forces in NATO, with
over 800,000 personnel. This constitutes thirty-seven percent of the standing
manpower forces in Europe available to NATO. She defends twenty-seven percent of
the land area of NATO Europe and thirty-seven percent of the NATO-WARSAW Pact
land frontier. Turkey shares 619 km of land border with the Soviet Union, '^he Black
Sea coastline of Turkey facing the Soviet Union is 1600 km long [Ref 1].
Today, the capability of peacetime deterrence and mobilization missions depend
heavily on the existance of modern weapon systems and military equipment. Without
these, modern systems and equipment no armed forces can succeed. This study will
focus on the modernization process of the Turkish Armed Forces which is required to
enable Turkey to fulfill its vital role in defense of its homeland and NATO.
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B. OBJECTIVES
The principle objective of this thesis is to analyze and evaluate alternative
acquisition strategies for Turkish Armed Forces with emphasis on the life cycle support
aspects of each alternative.
This study will define the current problems and explain the current
implementation policy, present alternative policies, identify the advantages and
disadvantages associated with each alternative, and propose a process to solve the
identified problem.
The subsidiary objectives of this thesis are:
1
.
To identify Turkish arm sales policy,
2. To determine the results of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions between
Turkey and other countries,
3. To examine acquisition strategies for Turkey derived from lessons learned by
other nations.
C. FOCUS AiND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
Today, the capability of peacetime deterrence and mobilization missions depend
heavily on the existance of modern weapon systems and military equipment. In the
author's opinion, without these modern systems and equipment no Armed Forces can
succeed. This study will focus on the modernization process of the Turkish Armed
Forces. In this process, the current Turkish acquisition process will first be examined;
next, alternative acquisition policies will be studied with the emphasis on life cycle
support and finally, recommended courses of action will be presented.
There will be an important emphasis on the lessons learned from acquisition
strategies of other nations. Acquisition projects which were accomplished by other
countries wLU be reviewed as examples to see their various impacts.
The research is limited to the United States publications or foreign publications
and documents which were collected through the Naval Postgraduate School Library.
D. METHODOLOGY
Primary research entailed a literature review of the latest implementations of the
acquisition strategies of coproduction, technical data package (TDP), "Life of Type"
buy (Buy-out) and hcensing. The literature was collected through the Naval
Postgraduate School Library, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE), Administrative Science Department Library, and various newspapers and
11
Additional data was collected from examination of both U.S. and Turkish
directives, instructions, guidelines and written correspondence with personnel in the
Turkish Ministry oi" Defense.
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A. THREAT
Hostility between Russia and Turkey has a long and violent history. Over the
course of centuries they have battled each other thirteen times: the first was in the
period between 1676 and 1681, and the last in the years 1914 to 1918 [Ref 3: p. 1].
The treaty of friendship, signed by the Soviet Union and Turkey on March 16, 1921,
was the first major international treaty for each. The friendship treaty was renewed in
1925. But shortly after World War II, the Soviets tried to take control of the
Bosphorus (Turkish Straits). President Truman's response was to send the battleship
USS MISSOURI to Turkey. Following these events, the U.S. militar}' aid to Turkey
was begun in 1947. Because of Turkey's geo-strategic position there was a very urgent
need to have modern equipment. The U.S. military assistance program played an
essential role in preventing Turkey from being swallowed by the Soviet colossus to the
north right after the Second World War [Ref 4: p. 2]. Soviet-Turkish relations
remained frozen until the 1960s. The U.S.S.R. had sought normahzation but Turkey
had abstained. Normalization of relations between Turkey and Soviet Union moved
forward steadily after the clash with the U.S. over Cyprus in the summer of 1964. The
normalization process was dominated by economic relations [Ref 5].
Turkey plays an exceptional and critical role as the anchor of NATO's
southeastern front in Europe, facing the longest border with the Warsaw Pact of any
alhance member. In addition, Turkey secures the Turkish Straits and deters any
attempted Soviet movement into Southwest Asia through the Transcaucasus Region.
In the Middle East, Turkey also plays a critical role in defending vital sea and land
lanes of communication which cross the region, as well as providing a potential barrier
to Soviet adventurism in the Middle East region's enormous oil reserves [Ref 6: p. 30].
Turkey's defense policy is predicated on deterrence and therefore its standing
military force is second only to the U.S. in NATO. Turks recognize that their ability
to resist intimidation must be grounded in internal resources; in the early stages of a
war, they would have to fight alone and could not count on early reinforcements
[Ref 7: p. 440]. Counting the Soviet divisions on their eastern border and the
Bulgarians on the west, the Turks today face a total of forty to forty-five Warsaw Pact
13
divisions [Ref. S]. Turkey is likely to be the first target in the event of a
NATO/WARSAW Pact war [Ref 9]. However, most military' analysts believe that it
would be extremely difficult for Turkey to efiectively perform its wartime NATO
military' missions because of its equipment obsolescence and problems with spare parts
[Ref 10].
The war between Iran and Iraq has endured for more than five years, and
continually threatens to spill over to neighboring states and to disrupt the flow of oil
from the Persian Gulf [Ref 11: p. 11]. According to author Miroslaw Nincic from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Turkey, of all the NATO nations,
would be most rapidly exposed to direct military involvement. There are numerous
ways to be drawn into the conflict. Three stand out as particularly likely: 1) Soviet
airlift operations toward the Persian Gulf area, 2) Soviet actions acamst U.S. bases in
Turkey, 3) U.S. use of military bases in Turkey for the intermediate basing of some
portion of its airlifted troops [Ref 9: pp. 55-63].
Today Turkey's role in the defense of Europe (and Asia Minor) and its potential
role in the security of the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions has become
increasingly significant [Ref 7: p. 421]. Due to Turkey's strategic location in relation
to the U.S.S.R.
,
NATO, and the Middle East, it is one of the largest recipients of U.S.
military assistance in the world [Ref 12]. Although Turkey is one of the largest
recipients of U.S. military' assistance in the world, most of the Turkish weaponry' is out
of date.
U.S. editorialist Jack Anderson stated his concerns on this subject as follows:
"What if a full-scale attack came?.... Tactically, the best bet would be to fall
back on the nearby town of Kars and then to Erzurum, where NATO nuclear
weapons are deployed. Retreat would be in order because the Turks' weaponry
is antique by military standards. Their principal tank, the U.S. made M-48, dates
to the Korean War era.... a chemical attack preceding to a Soviet invasion
"would wipe the Turks out", according to an American offical. "They have
hardly a gas mask among them", he explained" [Ref 10].
In the author's opinion, the best statement of the problem to be addressed by
this thesis was made by the Honorable Richard N. Perle, Former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy. He stated that;
"...Turkey and U.S. have just signed a new defense and economic cooperation
agreement (DECA), which will govern our defense relations and facilities at least
to 1991. The Turkish miUtar>' is saddled with much increasingly obsolete
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hardware, some of which is rapidly becoming unsupportable. More important,
this obsolete equipment, even if it were supportable, would simply not do the job
on the modern battlefield. UNXESS MODERNIZATION OCCURS, FUNDS
WILL BE SPENT ON MAINTAINING OBSOLETE WEAPONS SYSTEMS
THAT OVER TIME RETURN LESS AND LESS IN DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES. Current programs have now reached a level at which the badly
needed modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces may proceed, albeit slowly.
Nonetheless, to reverse the obsolescence of Turkey's military establishment will
require years of greater expenditure and effort. Moreover, from now until the
early 1990's Turkey's defense-debt service burden alone will hover above S300
million annually." [Ref. 6: p. 30]
B. CURRENT STATE OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES
1. General
Turkey has received most of its weapons and other military equipment
through U.S. and German Security Assistance. The military relationship between the
U.S. and Turkey began in 1948. This relationship has been continuous with the
exception of the arms embargo in the mid-1970s, Turkey's current spare parts and
weapon problems are caused primarily by already obsolete equipment, inflation in
weapon costs, the U.S. worldwide shift from grant to loan military aid, the lack of
usable U.S. excess defense articles, the costly purchase of some militar}' equipment
(during the U.S. arm embargo), and Turkey's domestic economic problems [Ref. 13].
Most of Turkey's military equipment was bought in the 1960s. As a result,
Turkish weapons are ten years older than those of most other NATO nations,
Turkey's large U.S. -built tank force is more than twenty years old and unless upgraded
soon it will no longer be supportable by the normal U.S. foreign military sales logistics
systems. All U,S. -built major naval combat vessels in the Turkish Navy are over thirty
years old. Most of Turkey's U.S.-built air cargo planes are non-supportable by the
normal U.S. EMS logistics system because of their age, Turkey is low on spare parts
in ail services [Ref, 13: pp, 15, 16], In May 1979, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "at least one half of
Turkey's major miUtary equipment was inoperable, and much of the rest was obsolete
[Ref. 14: p. 267].
Even though Turkey is one of the largest recipients of the United States
military assistance in the world today, the United States government enacted an
embargo on Turkey during the Cyprus crisis. That embargo significantly weakened the
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capability of the Turkish Armed Forces. Following the U.S. embargo, increased
awareness of Turkey's importance to strategic planning led the U.S. to strengthen ties
between the two countries. In December 19S1 the two governments announced the
establishment of a high-level joint military group to improve defense cooperation. The
purpose of this initiative is to improve NATO's posture in the region and modernize
the Turkish Armed Forces. Included is U.S. aid in building two new air strips capable
of handling long-range bombers and cargo planes in eastern Turkey [Ref 15: p. 160].
2. Spending on Arms and Effectiveness Trade-offs
The equipment received from the U.S. shortly after World War II and the
Korean War was relatively new at the time. It was easy and cheap to maintain and
support these weapons when they were first received. It can be said that in the early
phase of their Ufe cycle, these weapons and military equipment provided his^h
effectiveness and deterrence for the Turkish Armed Forces. Most of this equipment is
now at the end or beyond planned hfe cycles. So, it's very expensive to keep this
equipment working since they are no longer in production (See Appendix E for a
complete list of Turkey's procured weapon systems). Table 1 shows a sample of this
weapon systems being used in Turkey.
In the author's experience during six years of field duty, gasoline requirements
of the U.S. built vehicles are almost twice as much as stated in technical manuals.
Electronic equipment has lost their sensitivity because of their age. The range of the
radios is lower than stated in technical manuals. Because this equipment is so old, it is
very costly to support. As a result, Turkish defense budget increases result in very
little increase in the effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces. It is apparent that
Turkey needs to determine an acquisition policy to overcome her continuing military
obsolescence.
The effectiveness and cost relationships for the Turkish Armed Forces after
the arm sales transactions in late the 1940s and 1950s are shown in Figure 2.1.^ Figure
2. 1A illustrates the relationship between Turkish arm spendings in 1950s and
effectiveness of Turkish Armed Forces. Effectiveness can be defined as a function of
probability of deterrence. In Figure 2. IB, Turkish arms spendings in 1950s resulted in
high deterrence capabiUties (steeper curve). The reasons of these would be
procurement of modern equipment (mostly through grant aid), high availability,
These figures and explanations are used with the permission of Prof F. Horton,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1987.
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TABLE 1
SOME WEAPON SYSTEMS BEING USED IN TURKEY
Selected NATO Weapons Systems Strength
Basic Systems Built by the U.S. Prior to 1964j
1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8
Turkey Other Turkey Other Turkey Other
NATO NATO NATO
AIRCRAFT
F-S'^ ( 1946 ) 32 62 -Greece - - - -
RF-84 (1946) 20 18 -Greece _ 20 -Greece 8 _
F-fl6 (1952) - 25 -Portugal - - - -
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supportability and maintainability and less arms spendings of unfriendly countries.
However, this deterrence weakened over time. Figure 2.1C illustrates this trend.
"Effectiveness" is a function of "ProbabiUty of Deterrence" and "Probability of
Deterrence" is influenced by "Defense spending of Turkey (same direction), and
"Defense Spending of Unfriendly Countries (opposite direction)". It suggests that the
more Turkey spends on defense, the more effectiveness or deterrence she has. The
more unfriendly countries spend on defense, the less deterrence Turkey has. In the late
1940s and early 1950s, Turkey got an enormous amount of military aid from the U.S.
under the Truman Doctrine. They were inexpensive and modern weapons. High
elTectiveness resulted from minimal spending, because the marginal eOectiveness to cost
ratio was very high. The probability of deterrence and defense spending relationships
are shown in Figure 2.1C. The probability of deterrence is a function of military'
assistance received by Turkey, defense spending by Turkey, and the defense spending of
advisarial neighbor countries.
Over time, Turkey could not replace those weapons and most of them became
obsolete. Now, Turkey spends a lot of money to keep obsolete weapons working.
Spare parts expenses, maintenance difficulties and normal wear have already made
them less effective. Also, most of the unfriendly countries in the region are spending a
lot of money on arms and defense as well as receiving Soviet military assistance.
Soviet military' sales/assistance and economic assistance have shown enormous growth
in the past ten years, especially in the Middle East. Arms spending of unfriendly
countries in the Middle East was listed in the top rank among Third World major-
weapon importing nations during 1979-1983 [Rcf 9: p. 25]. Five of the nine leading
arms importing countries from 1979 to 1983 were located in the Middle East. Of these
nine top importers, four were supplied primarily by the Soviet Union. During
1979-1983, Iraq imported S17.6 billion and Syria imported S10.5 biUion worth arms by
itself [Ref. 16]. In contrast, Turkey received only Sll billion in U.S. aid (Economic
S3.Q bil.. Military S7.1 bil.) during 1946-1984 [Ref 17].
3. Alternatives of the Traditional Turkish Acquisition Policy
The previous traditional acquisition method (FMS) discussed above has
resulted in Turkey having only old and unsupportable weapons [Refs. 4,14]. It would
appear that the modernization process of the Turkish Armed Forces can not be
accomplished with only Military Assistance programs. The annual military assistance













Spendings on arms in 1950s
A
Spending on arms in 1950s
P(D)
Spendings on arms
P(D) = Probability of deterrence
Effectiveness = E [ P(D) ] ; (Effectiveness is a function of probability of deterrence)
P(D) = f(Defense spending of Turkey, Defense spending of unfriendly countries)
(Source: Prof. F. Morton Naval Postgraduate School, 1987)
Figure 2.1 Cost - Effectiveness Relationship
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achieve modernization of the Turkish Armed forces, Turkey has allocated S4 biUion a
year to spend on arms (Defense budget + Defense Industries Fund + SSOO million
from U.S. + S200 million from West Germany) [Ref IS].
The following four acquisition policies can be thought o^ as alternative
acquisition policies to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces:
1. Coproduction: To produce the military equipment in Turkey through
participation with U.S. and other countries.
2. Life of Type Buy: Buy all necessary spare parts of a weapon system which will
probably be needed during the life cycle of this weapon system.
3. Licensing: Weapons can be produced under hcensing agreements.
4. Technical Data Package (TDP): Turkey can buy the TDP of the weapon
systems and have them produced either in Turkey or in other industrial nations.
5. These four alternatives will be examined and discussed in this thesis.
20
III. TURKISH iMILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE AND ACQUISITION
POLICY EVOLUTION
A. TURKISH MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE
Contrary to the belief of many, Turkey has had its own defense industries for
many years, however, before the 1950s, the major acquisition strategy used was
licensing. In 1914, Turkey produced its own infantry rifles and ammunition under
license from Mauster Industries of Germany. It has been manufacturing its own field
guns and mortars since the 1920s. In 1933, at Kayseri, the Turkish Air Force began to
build its own fighter-bomber aircraft under Polish license. Until 1946, Turkey also
manufactured a Miles Magister trainer aircraft under British hcense and shortly after
that built its own indigenous twin-engine, small passenger aircraft [Ref 19: pp. 72-74].
Twenty-two factories will be examined in this section. The first five air factories
are not in existence today.
1. Tomtas Aircraft Factory
The structure of the factory looked like many of today's joint-ventures. The
foreign participant of the Tomtas Aircraft Factory was the German Junkers Company.
In 1925, in cooperation with the German Junkers Company an aircraft and engine
factoiy under the name of Tomtas was built in Kayseri. A repair and overhaul factory
was built in Eskisehir. The company produced single-engined Junkers A-20s [Ref 1: p.
179]. This factory is not in existence today.
2. Kayseri Aircraft Factory (KAF)
The Kayseri Aircraft Factory (KAF) started in 1932 in cooperation with some
U.S. experts led to the production of fifteen Curtis HAWK fighters and ten Fleshing
trainers. This was followed by fifteen German GOTHA 145 training and transport
aircraft, twenty-two Polish PZI-23 and twenty-five British Miles MAGISTER trainers.
The production in Kayseri continued until 1939, at which time the Turkish Air Force
took over the repair, overhaul and procurement of aircraft [Ref 1: p. 179]. KAF is not
in existence today.
3. Nuri Demirag Aircraft Factory
In 1936 an aircraft factory was founded in Besiktas (Istanbul) and assembly
shop was founded in Yesilkoy. In this factory, fifteen ND-37 trainers developed by
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Selahacldin Alan were manufactured and used for pilot training [Ref. 1: p. 179]. They
had planned to proiuce the twin-engine S-seated ND-38 after producing ND-37. The
aircraft was ready for production but work ended when German engineers returned to
Germany (because of the World War II). For some time the factor\' continued to
make parts for Westland LYSANDER reconnaissance aircraft but stopped
manufacturing in 1943. [Ref 1: p. 179]
4. Turkish Air League Aircraft Factory
In the Second World War, Polish engineers emigrating from German occupied
Poland came to Turkey. With their cooperation an aircraft factory was founded in
Ankara Etimesgut in 1941. At first, sixty FOUGA MAGISTER trainers were
produced, and later, under the name of THK, other aircraft and gliders were
manufactured. The aircraft factory was handed over to MKEK (Makine ve Kimya
Endiistrisi Kurumu) by law in 1953. Following this takeover the Turkish Air Force
ordered one hundred aircraft. Only sixty MKEK-4 UGUR au-craft were manufactured.
The projects of the MKEK-3 Mehmetcik jet trainer and GOZCU artillery
reconnaissance aircraft were prepared but manufacturing stopped in 1959. Repair and
overhaul work continued until 1965. Five of the twin-engined THK aircraft were
exported to Denmark and three UGUR were given to Jordan as a present. Today,
Turkish Air League Administration owns 2 percent of the shares of the TAI (Turkish
Aerospace Industn.^ Inc.). It also owns or holds shares of five different production
companies. It is composed of five hundred thirty eight branches in the Provincial and
County Centers under the General Directorate. It provides aeronautic activities for
civiUans and students at the Flying, Gliding, Parachuting and Aeromodelhng School.
In addition, crop-dusting, air-forest fire fighting and transportation activities are
accompUshed [Ref 1: p. 179].
5. THK Aircraft Engine Factory
This factor>' was founded in 1945 on the basis of a license from De Havilland
Engines to produce GIPSY MAJOR engines. Manufacturing started in 194S but soon
financing became difficult and the company became a tractor factory in 1955 [Ref 1: p.
179].
6. Taskizak Naval Shipyard
The Taskizak Naval Shipyard, located on the Golden Horn within the present
city limit of Istanbul, was founded in 1455 by Fatih the Conqueror. In the following
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decades and centuries the Yard built and maintained most of the vessels in the
Ottoman Nav^.
In the early nineteenth centun-' modernization of the yard started. In 1S28 the
first steamboat was built and in 1886 the first Ottoman submarine was released. T]ie
peace treaty after World War I made Istanbul a demilitarized zone. Taskizak started
working mainly on merchant vessels and the majority of machinery and equipment was
transported to Golcuk (another military shipyard bordering the Marmara Sea). In
1941, Taskizak was reopened as a Naval Yard on a limited basis employing a handful
workers and engineers. A period of growth brought the Yard to its present size,
employing 3,000 workers [Ref 1: pp. 184-187].
The Taskizak naval shipyard is under the technical management of the
Turkish Naval Ileadquarters. The functions of the Yard are:
• New construction: designing, building and outfiting of military and merchant
vessels up to 10,000 tons,
• Repair work: the periodic maintenance, overhaul and repair of about 190 ships
per year as well as emergency repairs,
• Docking activities: dry docking of the above mentioned ships. Taskizak has
two floating docks with lift capacities of 3,000 and 2,500 tons respectively, and
a dry-dock for small vessels of about 500 tons,
• Miscellaneous activities: technical and practical assistance to military and
industrial estabUsliments in the area.
Taskizak's primary purpose is to constructing fast, modern naval vessels of
relatively small tonnage and various types of modern landing vessels. Since 1941
Taskizak has completed about one hundred and twenty ships, large and small. The
range of ships includes landing ships, patrol craft, coast-guard vessels, fast patrol boats,
tankers and coasters. Some of the most important projects included construction of
four DOGAN Class guided missile boats armed with HARPOON, and of a number of
170-ton Type SAR-33 coast-guard boats with very high top speeds [Ref 1: pp.
184-187].
7. Golcuk Naval Shipyard
The need to dock the battle cruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim (ex-German Goeben)
which was handed over to the Turkish Navy (Ottoman) in 1914 was the reason for
building the Golcuk Naval Shipyard. The first step in the construction of the Golcuk
Naval Shipyard was taken in 1924 by procuring 250 acres area for this project. An
important improvement program was started after approval of the U.S. Aid programs
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in 1947. Additional facilities were constructed using Turkish funds, and most of the
equipment which is in operation today was supplied through these programs.
The turning point for the Golcuk Naval Shipyard came in 1962. A complete
submarine overhaul was begun in cooperation with the Bureau of Shipyards and some
U.S. specialists. Today, the shipyard has 1,300 major pieces of equipment, 28,000 tons
of total lift capacity in floating docks, two slipways with dimensions of 150 x 24 and
80 X 20 metres. The yards has a building capacity for ships up to 30,000 tons and
employs 100 qualified engineers and 5,000 workers.
After delivery of three 209 class submarines from HDW of Kiel,
(Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG) Golcuk constructed two which went into service
in 1981 and 1983. Another submarine is now under construction. Golcuk is now
building two frigates of the Blohm and Voss MEKO 200 design with two others are
being built by HDW of Kiel and Blohm and Voss of Hamburg respectively.
During the 1970s Golcuk built two escort destroyers, BERK and PEIK
commissioned in 1973 and 1975 respectively. Turkish submarines of the IKL 209/1200
design are currently being built at Golcuk in close co-operation with HDW (under
German License). [Ref. 1: pp. 187,188]
8. Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK)
MKEK is the largest industrial organization in Turkey supplying the Turkish
Armed Forces and the private sector. The history of the company dates back to the
Ottoman Empire when military factories were erected in 1827 in different bases in
Istanbul. These were subsequently moved to Ankara during the War of Independence
in 1920 and reorganized under the General Directorate of iMilitary Factories. Today,
as a State Economical Enterprise, iMKEK reports to the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce and its performance is controlled by Parliament. It has 17,850 workers and
700 engineers [Ref. 1: pp. 171-174]. MKE runs twenty-one factories throughout the
country and produces:
Ammunition,
Plastic anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
Hand grenades and fuzes,







9 G-3 automatic infantry' rifie,
MG 3 machine gun,
MP 5 submachine gun,
81 mm mortars.
120 mm mortars (rifled),
105 mm tank gun barrel complete,
7.56 mm and 9 mm pistols,
2.75 inch rocket mortars,
HAR anti-tank rocket.
The company obtained licences for the German G-3 (infantry' rifle) and MG-3
(machine gun) from Rheinmetall and Heckler&Koch, and in 1981 licences from
Oerlikon for the 20 and 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, and the MP-5 from Heckler&Koch
(Germany). For extended range and APFS-DS ammunition licences were obtained
from the American General Defense Corporation. MKEK is ready to implement "Low
Altitude Air Defense Rocket" and air defense artillery fire control systems production.
In addition, MKEK is participating in the production of STINGER POST and
MAVERICK missiles within the European consortium [Ref. 1: pp. 171-174].
9. Aselsan
ASELSAN Military Electronics Industries Inc. was established in November
1975 to supply the Turkish Army with modern electronic equipment. With present
capital of about S17 million, it is owned by the Turkish Ground Force Foundation
(70.175%), the Turkish Air Force Foundation (12.4%), the Turkish Navy Foundation
(13.5%), Turkish PTT (Turkish Mail-Telephone-Telegram Inc. 1.8%), the Turkish
Police Foundation (1.75%) and OYAK Inc. (0.375%). ASELSAN is a very successful
company, showing a 164 percent increase in annual sales, 205 percent increase in
income and 68 percent increase in assets in 1985 [Ref. 1: pp. 175,176].
The company has 2600 employees of whom 270 are engineers. ASELSAN
Inc. started manufacturing in late 1979 with license production of VHF equipment.
Today, most of its products are its own design. Some of the current products are:
• 4600 Series VHF/FM Combat Area Radio Family,
• 4200/4500 Series VHF/FM Military and Professional Family (Its own design),
• 4800 Series VHF/FM Simplex/Duplex Synthesised Radios,
• 2400 Series Digital Encryption Equipment (Its own design),
• 2001 Telephone Scrambler (Developed by ASELSAN),
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• 7420/ Digital Message Device,
• 6500;TBX-Timc Division Branch Exchange,
• Computer Controlled Warning Systems (Developed by ASELSAN),
• 1200, Electronic Training Sets,
• Industrial Electronics (DC Motor Control Systems, uninterruptable Power
supplies, DC Power Supplies, etc. are designed and produced.
ASELSAN was also involved in the F-16 production program to produce
some avionics subcomponents. The first export orders were obtained in 1984, and a
year later exports reached Si 2.5 million. In 1986 its export sales were S20 million
[Ref. 1: pp. 175,176].
10. TUSAS Engine Industries (TEI)
As a consequence of the selection of the General Electric FllO-GE-100 engine
to power 160 Turkish F-16 C and F-16 D fighter aircraft, General Electric and its
Turkish partners established a joint venture company in Turkey. Delivery of the co-
produced engines for the Turkish Air Force began in 1987 [Ref 1: p. 177].
11. PARSAN Forging & Machining
PARSAN is a hot steel forging plant with special machining facihties for rear
axle shafts, front axles, steering, and under carriage parts. It was founded in 1968
[Ref 1: p. 177].
12. TUSAS Aerospace Industries Inc.
As a result of an inter-government agreement, a S4.2 billion joint venture to
produce 160 F-16 fighter aircraft was formed between TUSAS Aerospace Industries,
General Dynamics and General Electric. TUSAS Aerospace Inc. became a legal entity
on 15 May 1984 and the agreement included transfering forty-two years of aviation
expertise to the Turks. All but eight of the fighters will be built by TAI. In addition
to manufacturing and assembling the F-16 for the Turkish Air Force, TAI will
manufacture F-16 components for the U.S. Air Force. TAI has a contract with
General Dynamics to build 101 aft fuselages, 80 center sections and 69 shipsets of
wings. TAI will begin manufacturing components for USAF aircraft six months after
the first components are built for the Turkish F-16s. According to Jerr\' R. Jones,
managing director and deputy chairman of TAI, the joint venture company is slightly
ahead of schedule and will be the lowest-cost producer of aircraft in the world because
of very low Turkish labor rates. General Electric provides the F-llO-GE-100 engines
for the F-16s. A total of 177 engines are involved in the agreement. Westinghouse
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Electric Corp.,which builds the APG-68 radar for the F-16, is expected to form its own
joint venture company in Turkey by the end of July 1987 [Ref 20: p. 70].
13. OTOKAR
Otokar has established in 1963. It is one of the largest privately owned
industrial and commercial conglomerates and owns 119 companies with sales of S2.4
billion. Otokar produces buses, mini and midibuses, vans, pick-ups and armored
security vehicles. It will manufacture both civihan and military Land Rovers locally
with production capacity of 2,000 units per year including vehicles for the Turkish
Armed Forces. [Ref 1: p. 191]
14. OTOMARSAN
Otomarsan was founded in 1967. 36 percent of its shares are owned by
Daimler-Benz of West Germany. At first, buses (Mercedes-Benz) were manufactured
by Otomarsan under Daimler-Benz license. Today, it is a leader (77 percent of market
share in Turkey) in long distance passenger buses. Otomarsan is an active exporter to
the Middle East and North Africa (4,000 passenger buses and spare parts). Otomarsan
obtained government permission to initiate the largest automotive investment project
in Turkey and the Middle East for the production of commercial vehicles and diesel
engines of all kinds. Within the framework of this project, Otomarsan will
manufacture UNIMOG (a military field truck) and cross-country vehicles for the
Turkish Armed Forces. Its new truck and engine plant in Central Anatolia will be the
second important Mercedes concern in Turkey. The plant manufactures 14 to 26 ton
trucks, NATO-type military tactical vehicles of 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 5, and 10 ton capacity,
engines for these trucks, road tractors, trailers, and other land vehicles with an annual
production capacity of 5,500 trucks and 7,000 engines [Ref. 1: pp. 193-195].
15. METIS
The Metis Construction and Trade Company Ltd. is one of the leading
companies in Turkey in the field of industrial, commercial and military construction
projects [Ref. 1: p. 196].
16. TELETAS
Teletas produces telecommunication equipment of its own design and under
license to assist in upgrading the telecommunications networks of Turkey. It employs
1,800 qualified workers and 300 engineers [Ref. 1: pp. 196-198].
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17. HEMA Hydraulics Manufacturing and Trading Company
Hema was founded in 1972 in response to the growing demand for hydraulic
equipment. Its main products are high-pressure hydraulic gear pumps licensed from
Dowty and Plessey, hydraulic steering, mine props and sliding bar units manufactured
with the technical assistance of Peine-Salzgitter, and lift covers for Ford, Fiat, John
Deere and Tumosan tractors built in conformance with the appropriate U.S. and
Italian standards. [Ref. I: pp. 202,203]
18. HEMA Electronics Inc.
Its current products includes cruise recorders for land vehicles, intelligent
teleprinters, digital message communicators, C3I terminals, on-line cry'pto systems, and
various electronic modernization projects. [Ref. I: p. 203]
19. HEMA Gear Plant
This company was registered in 1974 and began mass production in 1980.
HEMA's annual capacity is 25,000 truck transmissions and differentials and 65,000 sets
ot tractor transmissions, differential gears and shafts. HEMA's products include:
EATON/HEMA 475 SMA transmissions, EATON/HEMA 542 SMJ, 570 SMS
transmissions, EATON/HEMA 16220 series two-speed differentials for heavy duty
trucks up to 25 tons 6vw suitable for on-and off-road applications. The plant is
capable of producing all the EATON-FULLER transmissions, and all ZF type
transmissions suitable for use on Mercedes, Chrysler Ford, BMS trucks, and all
agricultural tractors. [Ref. 1: pp. 204,205]
20. PROFILO Holding
The Profilo Group consists of 45 companies and employs 9,000-10,000 people.
Activities of the Profile Group have concentrated on production of household
appliances-mechanics, electronics, electro-mechanics, electronic components, electric
motors, communications devices, copper wire, aluminium production, ship building,
metal construction, prefabricated housing, solar energy, services and trading.
[Ref. 1: p. 205]
21. M.A.N.A.S.
The M.A.N. Truck and Bus Industry Joint-Stock Company was established in
1966. Production in 1986 was 8,000 units (6,000 units in the Ankara Plant and 2,000
units in the Istanbul Plant). M.A.N.A.S. employs 1,225 workers and expects to
employ another 8,000 to 10,000. The company produces mainly civilian or military
heavy trucks and tractors. [Ref. 1: p. 206]
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22. Recent Capabilities of the Turkisii Military Industrial Base
The Turkish economy is in a transition to hidustriaiization. Industrial product
export has increased by 78 percent from 1980 to 1985. This is an nidicator of this
transition. Today, Turkey has the capability of producing all kinds of light and heavy
diesel engines for land vehicles, small size diesel engines for locomotives, engines for all
tactical and armored vehicles of the Turkish Army and Navy, and engines up to 700
HP. In 1985, there were 34 companies working under the iManufacturing Industry
Regulations and 29 different licenses in the field of automotive production [Ref. 1: pp.
95-206]. Additionally, gears and transmissions, various gear pumps and accessories for
hydrauhc equipment and control systems, all forged parts and undercarriages of
excavators and all the special steel material requirements of the automotive industry'
are produced in Turkey by the private and public sectors.
One of the important sectors in the defense industry is the iron and steel
works. Total crude steel production capacity reached 7.3 milUon tons per year in 1985,
and a capacity of 500,000 tons per year is planned for high quality steel production .
Aluminium is also an important metal for the defense industry. The aluminium
production capacity of Turkey is 60,000 tons per year. An increase in capacity of
90,000 tons per year is under consideration by modernizing existing plants. The
domestic production of all types of aluminium end items is possible in Turkey today.
In the aluminium casting industry, mass production of automotive and durable
consumer goods and aluminium parts, is being realized in the desired quality and
specifications. [Refs. 1,21: pp. 123-202,90-92]
B. TURKISH ACQUISITION POLICY FROM LATE 1940s TO 1980s
The basic acquisition strategy of the Republic of Turkey in this era was to obtain
external mihtary assistance. Its main partners were the United States of America and
after 1964 the Federal Republic of Germany. The historical development of the
security assistance program and the strategy of the Foreign iMilitary Sales (FMS)
process will be examined in this section.
The United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany are the only
countries in NATO giving aid under a regular programme to those members of the
alliance which cannot afford to adequately equip their forces. Such aid is given in the
interest of the alliance in the form of money and material. The conditions and
procedures of U.S. and German aid are different.
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1. U.S. and Turkey Relations
Turkish,' U.S. friendship dates to the late eighteenth century and was officially
recognized by a treaty in 1830 [Ref. 17]. This close relationship continued with the
announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 [Ref 22]. This relationship
has strengthened both sides militarily. Turkey has gained strong allies and protection
against U.S. S. R, while providing for the control of the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus in case of hostilities, a strategic communication and transportation link
between Arab oil sources and the West, strategic information about Warsaw Pact
militar>' activities and the first line of defense for NATO's southern flank.
The Truman Doctrine signified the formal emergence of the United States as
Turkey's chief supporter in the West [Ref 4: p. 25]. This support by the West was a
result of several factors. First, the constant threat of the Union o[ Soviet Sociahst
Republics (U. S. S. R.) to gain control of the straits, and second, the desire to have an
economically and militarily strong Turkey on NATO's southern flank.
Describing his doctrine to a Joint Session of the House and Senate on iMarch
12, 1947, President Truman said:
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the
creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a
way of life free from coercion. I believe tliat it must be the foreign policy of the
United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures. In addition to funds, I ask the
Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to
Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of
reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and
material assistance as may be furnished [Ref 23].
After lengthly Congressional debate, an aid agreement was approved by both
the House and Senate [Ref 24: p. 1], and signed by President Truman on May 22, 1947
[Ref 25: pp. 103-105]. This agreement provided Turkey $152.5 milhon as military
assistance [Ref 26: p. 5]. In March 1948, the United States extended SIO million in
credits to Turkey [Ref 4: pp. 31-32]. This was put into law upon the signing of the
Economic Cooperation Act on April 3, 1948 [Ref 27: pp. 137-158]. As a follow-on to
these agreements, a U.S. - Turkey Mutual Defense Assistance Act was signed on
October 6, 1949 [Ref 28: pp. 714-721].
The Korean War provided Turkey its opportunity to join the North Atlantic
Treaty organization (NATO). Turkey had joined the United Nations (UN) on August
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15, 1945 [Ref. 29: p. 43]. On June 27, 1950 the UN Security Council invited the
organization's members to repel the armed attack against the Republic of Korea, which
was aided and abetted by the Soviet Union. In response to this request, the Turkish
government sent a mixed brigade of 4.500 men to the conflict. This unit was the tliird
largest to participate in this action, after the American and South Korean forces. As a
result of their distinguished actions, the Turks were highly praised by the other forces
[Ref. 30: p. 37]. In September 1951, both U.S. and Britain proposed full NATO
membership for Turkey and Greece. This proposal was accepted by the organization,
and on February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became full members of NATO
[Ref 4: pp. 41-44].
Cordial relations between the U.S. and Turkey continued until 1974. The
relationship between the United States and Turkey continued well except for an arms
embargo of Turkey. The embargo was in response to Turkish military action in
Cyprus and was lifted in 1977. By the time the embargo ended, Turkish Armed Forces
had been severely weakened. General Alexander Haig, the Commander of NATO,
indicated in July 1978 that less than half of Turkey's aircraft were operational
[Ref. 31: p. 8]. Less than a year later, in May 1979, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "at least one half of
Turkey's major military equipment was inoperable, and much of the rest was obsolete
[Ref. 32: p. 267].
Actually, Turkey's weaponry problem was recognized before the Cyprus
conflict. In 1973, Turkey formally established a ten-year plan to provide for
reorganization of its military and modernization of their equipment. The program,
known as REMO, called for increasing amounts of funds to be dedicated to investment
in modem military equipment [Refs. 5,32: pp. 25,256].
During the years of the embargo, Turkey considered different sources for
obtaining military equipment and spares. One source considered was domestic
production. The other important source was other NATO nations (especially
Germany) and some Arab Nations. It can be said that the embargo encouraged Turks
to seek better relations with her neighbors, but Turkey never accepted military' aid from
U.S.S.R. and the other Warsaw Pact nations.
With the lifting of the arms embargo and the 1980 Defense and Economic
Cooperation agreement, a vast amount of aid came from the U.S. President Reagan
has made it clear that he attaches great importance to increasing military aid to Turkey
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while Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has described it as "one of our most
urgent priorities" [Ref. 33].
2. U.S. Security Assistance Programs
The two traditional goals of U.S. security assistance strategy are:
• To build coalition defenses against Soviet-inspired or other threats to U.S.
global and regional interests,
• To enhance regional stability and contain regional conflicts by helping friends
and allies to defend themselves.
In addition to these two overarching goals, there are six basic objectives for
U.S. security assistance programs. They are:
• Promote Middle East peace,
• Enhance cooperative defense and security,
• Deter and combat aggression,
• Promote regional stability,
• Promote key interests through FMS cash sales and commercial military exports,
• Promote professional militarv relationships through grant training. [Ref 11: p.
31]
During the last five years, the U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch
together have affirmed the importance of Security Assistance as an element of U.S.
foreign policy and defense strategy. Legislative changes to the Foreign Assistance Act
and Arms Export Control Act, passed by Congress in 1981 and 1985, have added
clarity and flexibility to Security Assistance programs [Ref. 11: p. 1]. Important
changes in 1981 included the creation of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)
and the clarification of overseas assistance and sales program management. The
emergency drawdown authority under Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (FAA) has increased NATO cooperation in weapons development and
procurement [Ref. 11: p. 25].
Today, various security assistance programs include Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) credits (treasury and concessional), the Military Assistance Program (MAP),
the International Military Education and trainmg Program (I MET), the Economic
Support Fund (ESF), and Peace Keeping Operations [Ref. 11]. The ESF program is
only one component of economic assistance within the President's overall foreign
assistance budget (60 to 40 percent ratio of economic to military assistance). In
response to real worldwide needs, overall funding for security assistance grew by 84
percent from 1981 to 1986. Funding for the IMET program increased from S28.4
million in FY1981 to S54.5 million m 1986 [Ref. 11: pp. 3,24].
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U.S. security assistance is addressed in a statutory sense in the amended
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
The most comprehensive definition of security assistance can be found in Section 502B
of the FAA. The term security assistance means:
iMilitary assistance (Foreign [Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Sales Credit
Financing, the International Military Education and Training (I MET) Program,
the Military Assistance Program (MAP)), the Economic Support Fund (ESF) or
military education and training, peacekeeping operations, sales of defense articles
or defense services to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other
internal security forces of a foreign country under Section 38 of the Arms Export
Control Act [Ref. 34: pp. 2-1 - 2-U].
The U.S. Security Assistance Program actually consists of seven different assistance
programs:
The Military Assistance Program {MAP) in which defense articles and related
services, other than training, are provided to eligible foreign governments on a grant
basis. During the 1950s and 1960s, this grant aid-type program involved aimual
authorizations and appropriations in the billions of dollars [Ref. 34: p. 2-12].
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in which
training is provided in the United States, in overseas U.S. miUtary facilities, or by
mobile training teams to selected foreign miUtary and related civilian personnel. In
earUer years, grant aid training of foreign militarv' personnel was part of the MAP
appropriation. In FY 1976, the FAA contains a separate authorization for IMET
[Ref. 34: pp. 2-12,2-13].
The Economic Support fund (ESF) is authorized by Chapter 4 of Part 1 1 of the
Foreign Assistance Act. It was established to promote economic and political stability
in areas where the United States has special security interests and has determined that
economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major
economic or poHtical crises. ESF is a flexible economic instrument which provides
support for balance of payment support, infrastructure and other capital and technical
assistance development projects. [Ref 34: pp. 2-13,2-14]
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is authorized by Chapter 6 of Part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act. It was estabhshed to provide for that portion of Security
Assistance devoted to programs such as the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO), the U.S. contributions to the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
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and other programs designated specifically for peacekeeping operations [Ref 34: p.
2-13].
The Foreign Military Sales Financing Program: The FMS financing program
consists of "direct credit" and "guaranteed loans". The direct credit program involves
credit extended directly from Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) to a foreign
government. Israel and Egypt are participants in the direct credit program authorized
in Section 31 of the AECA.
Some 39 countries participate in the guaranteed loan program. Under this
program, a loan is made by the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) to the foreign
government. The outstanding balance of the loan is "guaranteed" by a special
guaranty reserve established by the U.S. government for that purpose. Guaranteed
loans are repaid with interest. [Ref 34: pp. 2-14,2-15]
Foreign Military Sales {FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program
FMS is a program through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense
articles, services, and training from the United States Government. The purchasing
government pays all costs associated with a sale. In essence, there is a signed
agreement (normally documented on a DD Form 1513— Letter of Offer and
Acceptance) between the U.S. government and a foreign government. Each DD Form
1513 is commonly referred to as a "case" and is assigned a case identifier for accounting
purposes. Under FMS, military items and services, including training, may be provided
from DOD stocks (Section 21, AECA) or from new procurement (Section 22, AECA).
If the source of supply is new procurement, the U.S. Government agency or military
department assigned cognizance for this "case" is authorized to enter into a subsequent
contractual arrangement with industry in order to provide the item or service
requested.
Foreign Military Construction Sales, as authorized by Section 29 of the
AECA, involve the sales of design and construction services to eligible purchasers.
The construction sales agreement and sales procedures generally parallel those of FMS.
[Ref 34: pp. 2-15-2-17]
Commercial Sales Licensed Under the AECA is a sale made by U.S. industry
directly to a foreign buyer. Unlike under FMS procedures, the sale transaction is
administrated by DOD and does not involve an intra-government agreement. Rather,
the U.S. Governmental control procedure is through licensing by the Office of
Munitions Control, Department of State. Commercial licensed sales are authorized
under Section 38 of the AECA. [Ref 34: pp. 2-17,2-18]
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Prior to 1979, over S3. 7 billion was provided to Turkey under the U.S.
Security Assistance Program. Through 1987, FMS and MAP accounted for almost S4
biUion. Turkey is the third highest recipient of U.S. military aid among the 48 nations
provided assistance, being surpassed only by Israel and Egypt. U.S. Security
Assistance for Turkey reached a high point in the mid-80s with S715 milhon provided
in FY 1984. Aid dropped to S700 million in 1985, S615 million in 1986, and to S490
million in 1987. While the U.S. Congress is well aware of Turkish requirements, these
consecutive reductions reflect Congressional concern over the need for lowering the
budget deficit within the United States. Despite these declining trends, it should be
noted that there has been a marked increase in iMAP grants for Turkey, in both total
sums and as a percentage of the annual security aid. Over the past three years, there
has also been an increasing amount of FMS credits provided to Turkey at the
concessional 5 percent interest rate. In fact, by 1987, the Treasury rate credits were
discounted in favor of concessional FMS credits.
This growing trend in grant aid and concessional aid partly offsets the recent
overall reductions in security assistance. This type of aid provides a greater "dollar
value" than the high interest Treasury rates. In addition, the International Military
Education and Training Program (IMET) has enabled over a thousand Turkish
personnel to participate in various programs during the past five years. The Economic
Support Fund (ESF) is intended to provide balance of payments support, and is
designed to help Turkey continue her policy of movement toward a free market
economy. This fund is administered by the Department of State, and has followed a
trend similar to that of security assistance for Turkey. It has steadily declined from
S300 million in 1982 to SlOO million m 1987. [Ref. 21: pp. 115-117] (See Appendix F
for complete list of the U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey)
The majority of the U.S. security assistance package is being used for the F-16
C/D procurement/ coproduction program, the M-48 tank modernization program,
purchase of anti-tank missiles improved TOW, and T0W2, helicopters and artillery
equipment, plus U.S. equipment for the Turkish MEKO frigates and for operational
maintenance support of existing U.S. -origin weapon systems [Ref. 21: p. 116].
3. German Security Assistance
Strong military assistance from Germany began in 1964, with a NATO defense
donation being provided in 18-month installments. These installments began as 50
million marks in 1964, were raised to 100 million marks in 1969, to 130 million marks
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in 1979, and are now S200 million marks. A total of 930 million marks in aid were
received by Turkey in this period under this program alone [Ref. 35: p. 13]. German
assistance was especially valued because it was composed largely of grant aid.
German Defense Aid (in early years called "Militarv' Equipment Aid") is given
in 18 months increments. Each increment is now 200 million marks and consists of 80
percent new defense material of German origin and 20 percent of refurbished service
material. In addition, another fifteen increments (called trances), amounting to 1.45
billion marks are given under the Turkey Special Aid Program. The equipment is
subject to bilateral agreement under consideration of the Force Goals agreed with
NATO.
In addition to Defense Aid, Germany twice gave surplus material as packages
worth 650 million marks. The first section was given in August 1975 and the second,
which started in 1979, will be terminated in 1986/87. For example, 12,000 motor
vehicles have been given to Turkey.
Within the framework of the European Defense Improvement Program,
Germany gave 16 TRANSALL C-160 transport aircraft worth 300 million marks.
Four additional aircraft were included in a lot of Defense Aid. Germany accepted the
obligation of logistics responsibility. Special Defense Aid amounting to 600 million
marks including delivery of 77 LEOPARD 1A3 MBTs (Main Battle Tanks), four
LEOPARD recovery vehicles, Milan anti-tank missiles and conversion kits for the
modernization of 160 M-48 MBTs were provided between October 1980 and December
1983. Within the framework ofNATO Military Aid, Germany has provided:
• Two tank repair installations at Arifiye and Kayseri,
• Plant for production of M-48 spares,
• Equipment for the production of parachutes at Kayseri,
• Establishment of a standards and calibration organization and repair
installation for fire control equipment at Yenikent,
• Extension of an optical plant (Zeiss),
• License to produce MTU (Motoren-and Turbinen-L'nion) diesel engines for the
M-48 MBT,
• Establishment of a plant to produce 105 mm gun barrels at MKEK's (a Turkish
company) Kirikkale plant (Heckler & Koch with Royal Ordnance as
subcontractor) and plans to build a steel plant (Vereinigite Edelstahiwerke),
• Logistic support of 20 TRANSALL transports,
• Equipment for the two overhaul shops for Rolls Royce TYNE engines in
Eskisehir,
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• Assistance in modernization of two naval shipyards (Golcuk and Taskizak),
• Construction of two submarines (HDW),
• Material, parts and sections for four additional submarines (HDW),
« FRG Nato Defense Aids partly or completely support these projects.
As the above list shows, the majority of items served to improve or establish
maintenance and production facihties in Turkey. This means that military aid has been
a means to improve the country's defense industrial capacity [Ref. 1].
Another important feature of the Turkish-German military alliance was that
most of the procurements involved coproduction agreements, meaning that some parts
of them were produced in Germany and some in Turkey. In 1977, Germany and
Turkey agreed to a package which would provide four submarines. Two of these were
produced in Germany and turned over to Turkey. One additional submarine, produced
partly in Turkey and partly in Germany, was commissioned in 1980. The last was
produced fully in Turkey with German assistance [Ref 36]. There were some
additional packages such as Fast Gun Boats coproduction, Leopard tank
procurements, up-gunning and dieselization of Turkish iM-48 tanks, the deliver}' of
launchers and roughly 5,000 iMilan anti-tank guided weapons [Refs. 35,37]. In 1980,
Bonn agreed to 600 milUon marks of special militar}' assistance with grants of 150
million marks every 18 months, supplemented by further aid through December 1982
within the framework of the European Defense Aid Program [Ref 37: p. 743}.
4. U.S. Foreign Military Sales (EMS) Process
As previously stated, U.S. military' assistance to Turkey has been significant
since the relationship between the two nations was estabhshed. In the I950's and early
1960's, the U.S. military assistance began with large amounts of grant aid, but the
emphasis shifted from grants to foreign military sales (FMS) in the late 1960's.
There are three types of FMS cases. These are I) Defined Order cases, 2)
Blanket Order cases (most blanket order cases are for follow-on support materials or
services), and 3) Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSA).
Under a CLSSA, the U.S. government purchases, stores, manages, and issues spare and
repair parts to the foreign customer using the U.S. logistics system. The purpose of a
CLSSA is to provide the customer with the same peacetime support as that given U.S.
forces having the same priority [Ref 38: pp. 1-1 - 1-12]. See Appendix C for a more
complete presentation of the FMS planning structure and FMS implementation
process.
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Normally, prior to the receipt of a customer's formal Letter of Request (LOR)
for data leading to the sale of a major weapon system or equipment, discussions and
informal exchanges of information have already occured. Sometimes the discussions or
exchanges are conducted under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
DOD policy, with respect to transportation and delivery of FMS material,
states that normally these actions Avill be accomplished by the foreign government.
The initial point of shipment is the point of origin. The point of delivery is the point
where responsibility for the physical movement of the FMS material passes from the
U.S. Government to the foreign government. Shipment of classified and certain
hazardous materials are made within the Defense Transportation System (DTS). The
DD form 1513, Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is the primary' document used to
convey the estimated FMS case price to the foreign government. In addition
,
this
document identifies the conditions and terms of sale, and the accompanying type of
assistance codes which indicate the payment schedule; whether the sale is to be
financed on a cash or credit basis [Ref 39].
As the administrator of the FMS program, DOD has the responsibility for
pricing defense articles sold. In general, material offered for sale through an FMS case
will be priced following the same cost principles used in pricing defense articles for
DOD use. Surcharges are added to ensure:
• Recovery of all cost incurred by DOD components,
• A reasonable contribution to cost incurred in RDT&E and establishing the
production facilities for the article,
• An administrative charge for use of the DOD logistics system. [Ref 40: p. 7-3]
In addition to the broad objectives of Security Assistance Programs previously
presented, FMS has many benefits to the seller. The Security Assistance Program,
through cash and financed sales, supports as many as 650,000 jobs in the U.S. and thus
has a very positive economic impact [Ref. 11]. It provides military benefits in the form
of base rights. The xMilitary Facilities Agreements gave the U.S. permission to build
military bases on Turkish soil. FMS has lowered per unit production costs as a result
of economies of scale and increased production experience. This in turn lowers
weapons costs to the U.S.. By selling weapons to foreign customers, the number of
units produced increases and that lowers the unit cost of the weapon. The recovery of
research and development costs are the most direct source of savings. Perhaps the
most expensive and risky part of the weapon system acquisition is the research and
development phases. With FMS, the foreign purchaser shares a part of these costs.
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Once initial orders are satisfied, it may become necessary to close production
facilities and to later reopen them when additional orders are required. Both the
closing and reopening of production facilities involve expenses which add to L'.S.
procurement costs. If foreign orders for these items can be interspersed with U.S.
orders, production is maintained and the closing and opening costs are saved. Many
defense industries, the aerospace industry in particular, have come to depend on FMS
to remain solvent (especially during the post-Vietnam era). During the Vietnam era,
the U.S. military required large amounts of military equipment and the U.S. military
industry' flourished. After the war, domestic needs for weapons declined rapidly and
many U.S. defense arms sold their excess capacity outside the U.S..
There are other benefits of FMS to the seller as well. FMS promotes friendly
ties from which good trade relationships can be built. It frequently provides the
opportunity for increased sales of nonmilitary items to recipient nations. Generally
speaking, weapon exporting countries are highly industrialized while recipients are
developing countries. FMS and friendly relations may provide a chance for recipients
to import their other non-military needs. The sale of domestic products to a foreign
purchaser generates a significant indirect flow of funds to the treasury.
There are also real benefits to Turkey as a result of FMS. It creates political
and military support. The U.S. is a key ally for Turkey . Shortly after World War II
the Soviets tried to take control of the Bosphorus. President Truman's response was to
send the battleship USS MISSOURI to Turkey. xMilitary assistance provides Turkey
with new technology capabilities and weapons with high technology (e.g., F-16 aircraft
project). It helps Turkey's economic development. The Economic Support Fund has a
direct positive effect on the Turkish economy. Local production by coproduction and
licensing agreements create job opportunities for Turkey. It also helps to create a
stabilizing influence in the area. Weapons acquired from FMS provides Turkey with
mihtary deterrence.
But FMS is not without disadvantages to the seller. Once delivered, the U.S.
has limited control over FMS material whether it be technology, weapons or
information. FMS allows other countries to gain high technologies which had
previously been exclusively held by the U.S.. Technology may not be the only loss
with co-production and licensing agreements. These agreements also result in a loss to
U.S. labor, assuming the countries involved would buy directly from the U.S. if no co-
production or licensing alternative were available. Additionally, there are increased
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manpower cost associated with the many personnel for the administration of the
foreign military sales by DOD and the U.S. Army, Naw and Air Force.
There are also some disadvantages to Turkey in the FMS process. Turkish
foreign debt has grown in the last several years. The proportion of the miUtar\' debt in
relation to general foreign debt has mcreased in recent years. Another economic
problem that Turkey has is the foreign currency problem. Repayment costs of foreign
military sales has increased after the shift from grant sales to loan sales. Repayment
costs for past FMS loans were equal to nearly half of the total new FMS credit
program in 1980 [Ref 5]. Another disadvantage is the long lead time involved in FMS.
The time between sending the MOU (memorandum of understanding) and receiving
ordered material is relatively long because of FMS procedures and the distance
between Turkey and the U.S.. This is an acute weakness in the event of war. Finally,
the dependency on foreign governments for defense needs results in no indigenous
capability and can lead to having old weapons systems. Turkey is one of the largest
recipients of U.S. military assistance in the world. However, with the exception of
recent agreements, most Turkish weaponry is not current, front line systems.
C. TURKISH ACQUISITION POLICY IN 1980s
Having already discussed FMS in detail, this section will examine the present
acquisition policies and strategies of Turkey.
Due to the state monopoly, Turkish private industry had not been able to enter
the defense industry until 1985. On the other hand, the Turkish defense industry giant
MKEK and several other publicly owned companies have been suffering from financial
difficulties and have not been able to realize new investment opportunities.
Investments by foreigners in this area had been prohibited or strictly regulated. After
the adoption of the new economic policy, Turkish authorities applied a more liberal
policy toward establishment of a modern defense industry in Turkey. This was done
with the help of the Turkish private sector in collaboration with foreign technology and
capital. The instruments of this new policy have been brought by Law No. 3238 (See
Appendix D) enacted in November 1985 [Ref. 41].
Current defense procurement activities can be divided into two difTerent
categories. First, annual procurements by the Ministry of National Defense (MND)
which are a short term business opportunity in the sense that it will be a one time sale
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contract. The second category is long term procurements realized by the newly
founded Defense Industry' Support and Development Fund Administration (DIDA).
These procurements are long term business opportunities.
Military mission needs and requirements are determined by the Turkish General
StafT (TGS), and take into consideration current developments related to present
enemy threats. TGS examines deficiencies and technical opportunities. These needs
and requirements are translated into a Five Year Plan for Strategic Goals (FYPSG).
This plan is subject to annual review and is also referred to as a Rolling Plan. Annual
procurement programs within the plan are implemented by either MND or DIDA.
The plan indicates the amount of material to be procured, the procurement schedule
and their related financial source. The financial sources of defense expenditures are:
• Annual budget of Ministry of National Defense(MND),
• Accumulated funds of DIDA,
• Accumulated funds of the Army, Navy, Air Force foundations,
• Credits and grand aids from the NATO allies,
• Commercial credits from countries that are in defense cooperation with Turkey.
[Ref. 21: p. 90]
The guiding principle in today's Turkish Armed Forces' modernization drive is
to strive for self sufficiency through local production. Therefore, a special law set up
DIDA with the objective of "development of modern defense industry and
modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces" according to the law's preamble. This
law instituted a number of tax levies on sales of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, lotteries
and gambling, on all imported goods, and on income taxes, and resulted in
approximately SI billion in revenues for DIDA. In addition, the procurement share of
the defense budget now comprises one fourth of all government spending. Combined
with security assistance of S800 million annually from the United States and S200
million per year from West Germany, these revenues mean Turkey now has some S4
bilHon a year to spend on arms [Ref. 18].
The Financial Planning and Programming Department of the Turkish General
Staff (TGS) is responsible for the coordination of these financial sources for
procurement purposes for the current fiscal year. In accordance with Law No. 1325,
MND is responsible for the procurement of defense material for the Turkish Armed
Forces (See Appendix D; Law Concerning the Establishment of DIDA).
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According to the related annual procurement program, weapons procurement is
carried out either through in-country expenditures or international procurement. In all
cases. State Tender Law No. 2S86, State Accounting Law No. 1050, and Supreme
Accounting Court Law No. 832 are applicable (See Appendix D). Law No. 2SS6 is the
basis of procurement in Turkey for in-country defense businesses and no action can be
taken which is not in accordance with it.
For the implementation of annual procurement programs, a Department of
Economy and Technology was founded within the organizational structure of MND.
The head of this department is also the Deputy Undersecretary of MND (See Figure
3.1). Although the Minister of National Defense is the sole authority for the
utilization of the MND budget, the budget is shared among the three forces and TGS.
The Gendarmer> comes directly under the Ministr\' of Internal Affairs. For the
implementation of any procurement project, the related force is expected to transfer the
necessary financial funds to MND.
The technical specifications for a procurement project are prepared by the force
command concerned. For a specific procurement project the specifications are made
available at MND. If a tender or proposal does not fulfil the technical specifications in
all aspects, it will not be considered valid during the evaluation phase. When
apphcable, MND sends a Request for Proposal (RFP) to selected firms. The proposal
should meet all the conditions of the request format. Proposals which are not
submitted on time or which are untidy or incomplete, are not considered by the
Evaluation Committee. For each specific procurement project, a separate Evaluation
Committee is assigned. During the evaluation phase, only the Evaluation Committee
can initiate specific and detailed questions in writing to the firms. The requests of
firms for a briefing or demonstration cannot be taken into consideration.
All evaluations are made by mathematical and scientific and engineering
methods. These activities are regulated by MND Directives L-U, L-12, L-13. During
the first part of the evaluation phase, the Committee do-i^s not make price comparisons.
At the end of the second phase of the evaluation, which takes into consideration the
technical specifications and prices, the firms are sometimes called in for a final price
reduction. According to procurement regulations, competing firms can be invited to
provide a demonstration or field trials in order to show the performance of their
products. If the specific procurement requires investment and coproduction in Turkey,






























Figure 3.1 Organization Chart [Rcf, 21 : p. 90j.
and financial aspects of the investment. Such a procurement project could also start
with DIDA from the beginning.
Turkish defense equipment procurements can also be carried out by the Federal
Procurement Office (BWB) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), on behalf of
the Turkish MND. In this case, MND sends the technical specifications and makes a
request for procurement in the FRG. After the draft contract between the selected
German firm and BWB is approved in Ankara, procurement procedures are finalized by
BWB in Koblenz, FRG. In such a case, the procurement projects could be financed
either by the Turkish national budget or by German Defense Aid Funds. In the latter
case, German procurement regulations would be used.
Quality control during the production phase and final acceptance tests is
executed by quaUty control experts of MND at related facilities. If the production
takes place in a NATO country, MND can send a written request for STANAG
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(Standardization Agreement in NATO) 4107 and 4108 to be utilized for quality control.
In this case, quality control will be carried out by that country's niilitan.' quality
control experts on be half of the MND. When the procurement phase of the
acquisition is completed, further logistics functions such as storage, distribution,
operation and maintenance as well as, and more importantly, product improvement
and modernization of equipment follow.
The Defense Industry Development Administration (DIDA) plays an important
role in the long term project of the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. Law
No. 3238, enacted in November 1985, determines the conditions by which this fund
(defense industry support fund) will be utilized and, consequently, the fund
administration, DIDA, has been established. The structure of DIDA, was also
determined by this law (See Appendix D).
Law No. 3228 also established a two-tier decision making mechanism including
the Defense Industr}' Supreme Co-ordination Board and the Defense Industry
Executive Committee (Committee). DIDA receives the directives for the
implementation of defense industry projects from the Defense Industry Executive
Committee (Committee) which is responsible for the final decision on determination of
the ways and means of procurement programs, financial and economic incentives to be
provided to the manufacturers, long term orders and essential issues of financing
through the fund. This committee is chaired by the Prime xVIinister and the Chief of
General Staff and the Minister of National Defense are members of the committee.
Above the Committee there is the Defense Industry Supreme Coordination Board
(Board), which is also chaired by the Prime Minister and its members consist of the
Chief of General Staff, the Minister of National Defense and the Force Commanders.
One of the important functions of this board is to determine the type of procurement;
i.e. direct purchase, investment and in-country production, coproduction with a foreign
partner, and government involvement of a procurement project in Turkish industry.
Within this context, the board observes the plan for strategic goaLi which was
discussed at the beginning of this section. A fiow chart of the decision making
mechanism for a long term procurement is shown in Figure 3.2.
In order to offer sound cooperation opportunities to foreign investor
industrialists and Turkish private industry, the Committee is authorized by law to give
decisions in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Coordination Board on the
following:
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A FLOW CHART OF THE DECISION MAKING MECHANISM FOR A LONG TERM PROCUREMENT
PROJECT CAN BE GIVEN AS FOLLOWS;
i 1























Figure 3.2 Decision Making Process [Ref. 21 : p. 91].
• Implementing procurement plans and programs that are to be determined in the
Plan for Strategic Goals,
• Developing a modern defense industry in Turkey, which will incorporate the
private and government sector industries through foreign investment, high
technology transfer and Turkish Government involvement for investment and
finance,
• Organizing and coordinating industrial research and development and prototype
manufacturing,
• Making advance payments and fmancing multi-year procurement projects,
• Determining economic and financial promotions and exemptions for industrial
investments.
The inter-relationship of the Board, Committee and DIDA and the utilization of









































Figure 3.3 Interrelations of the Board, Committee, and DIDA [Ref. 21 : p. 90].
DIDA is the organization responsible for all the ground work of this system. Its
responsibilities start after the point where the planned requirements of the Turkish
Armed Forces are determined and extend up to the point when the weapon, material or
equipment is taken out of use by the Turkish Armed Forces. During this long and
complicated process, DIDA conducts strategic evaluations; issues requests for
proposals; calls for tenders; makes technical, economic, financial and management
evaluations and submits the final appraisal reports of the projects to the Committee.
After the decision of the Executive Committee, the implementation of the programs are
carried out by the Administration, including contracts and quality and technology
control work. DIDA is also the authority to evaluate or to coordinate evaluation
studies of all investment or production proposals for defense-related industrial products
to be manufactured within Turkey.
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The chief executive ofiicer of the Administration is called the president and also
serves as the Secretary' of the Executive Cominittec. He is assisted by three vice-
presidents and seven heads of departments. The studies of project appraisal are carried
out by experts in special working groups. The law obhges ministries and all other
government and militar>' organizations to support the Administration with personnel
and expertise when necessary-. The Administration is organized to accompUsh its task.
with the least possible bureaucratic limitations. General Accounting Law No. 1050,
State Tender Law No. 2886 do not apply for the contracts and expenditures of DIDA.
It is also exempt from certain taxes.
The Defense Industry Support Fund is an accumulated resource of financial
power, not limited by the fiscal year. The fund can be used for the purpose of
unlimited advance payments and credit loans in financing multi-year industrial
investments. By special arrangement, the fund provides extra incentives.
Turkey also olTers several incentives to defense projects in the framework of the




• Low interest domestic and foreign investment credits,
• Importation of used plants,
• Exemption from building construction taxes,
• Allocation of foreign exchange,
• Exemption from taxes, duties and fees on medium and long term credits
involving export commitments,
• Source utilization support premium,
• Leasing,
• Incentive premium for domestically obtained machinery and equipment,
• Postponement of Value Added Tax for investment goods.
In defense investments, Turkey desires to make the optimal use of existing public
and private sector capacity, which is believed to be the best way in order to save time
and money. Therefore, the idea of utilization of existing state-owned industrial
facilities, either in the form of in-kind capital contribution or by means of leasing and
similar arrangements, is open for negotiation. [Ref. 41]
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The approach for a possible cooperation in Turkey in the defense field is an
important factor in establishing healthy relationships. Irrespective of whether a long-
term or a short-term procurement project is condoned, the project initiation is either by
a call for tender or by the issue of a request for proposal by MND, (not by DIDA in
this case). This will be made official by declaration in the daily Official Gazette. As
discussed before, after initial evaluation is completed, the whole project will be
transferred to DIDA for the further evaluation of the selected proposals within
industrial investment and financial parameters. Demonstration and field programs are
carried out by a group of experts under the coordination of DIDA.
Product improvement and equipment modernization projects are also large scale
business opportunities in Turkey. Current equipment modernization projects






• REMO-II project of the Air Force,
• Fighter aircraft modernization.
The Armored Combat Vehicle procurement project is an example: Military
design specifications based on minimum tactical requirements were detailed by a group
of experts at MND. Proposals, as requested and delivered, were evaluated, taking into
consideration the technical, tactical and performance characteristics of the proposed
systems. After this phase, an order of preference was prepared by the mixed Working
Group at MND. The outcome of the evaluation study was presented to TGS for
approval. The whole study, as well as the order of preference, was sent to DIDA.
Evaluation studies of the economic, financial and size of the investment aspects are
currently continuing at DIDA. At this stage, the results of the field trials and the
reliability of the Turkish partner play an important role in the final decision for the
selection of the system.
In the case where the nominated Turkish partner was a government owned body,
or where a major holder is one of the Foundations, MND is permitted by law to make
a request for proposal directly through this body, provided that the product, subject to
the proposal, has already been selected by MND. The selection mechanism has
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already been discussed. In such a case, the foreign partner will sign a license and/or
coproduction agreement with a Turkish partner, before the submittion of the proposal
to MND by the Turkish Partner. In these cases, DIDA can take on the role of MND,
thus being able to benefit from the exemptions granted to DIDA, in order to function
more flexibly in dealing with the private sector. [Ref 21: p. 116]
D. SUMMARY
An embryonic Turkish national defense industry had been started around 1925.
State owned and private aircraft factories began to manufacture aircraft under licenses
from several European countries. Licensed production thereby developed aircraft
design capabilities within the country. In the mid- 1930s, an aircraft of domestic design
had been realized. At the same time, weapons, ammunition production and
shipbuilding capacity had been developed. By the end of World War II. mdustry was
geared to a war economy and more than half of the national budget was allocated to
defense.
By 1945, there existed some potential for further growth in the Turkish defense
industry. However, economic development assumed a higher priority, and U.S.
miUtary assistance removed the incentive to develop defense industries further. Since
the late 1940s, FMS has been the major acquisition strategy for Turkey.
Today, Turkish military needs can be expressed in the billions of dollars. These
urgent military needs are considered an opportunity to lower the high domestic
unemployment rate and to balance foreign trade.
The lessons learned from previous traditional acquisition strategies are that more
emphasis is required on the life cycle cost phenomenon. Acquisition decisions should
be made after initial planning on logistics supportability . It should be determined if
the system can be economically supported throughout its programmed life cycle. This
is logistics support analysis. Life cycle cost is the major parameter in this analysis. In
the evaluation of alternatives, the life cycle approach must be considered. Life cycle
cost (LCC) involves all costs associated with the system life cycle, to include:
• Research and development (R&D)cost,
• Production and procurement cost,
• Operation and maintenance cost,
• System retirement and phase out cost.
[Ref 42]
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There should be a reasonable trade-ofl between LCC and system efTectiveness.
This is expressed as the performance, availabihty and dependability of the system.
Alternative acquisition policies must be evaluated by using life cycle cost and long term
system effectiveness and supportability not only procurement cost. The next chapter
will discuss alternative acquisition poUcies which can be used now and in the future by
Turkey and which consider the long term cost and support of systems.
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In this chapter, four acquisition strategies will be examined in order to support
the determination of which is the best alternative to meet Turkey's objective of
obtaining modern, supportable weapon systems. These strategies are: coproduction,
technical data package, licensing and buy-out. The main purpose of this chapter is to
explore advantages and disadvantages of the acquisition strategies, however, before
beginning that discussion a fundamental knowledge of technology transfer is required.
2. Technology Transfer Process
Technology transfer is the process of transferring, from the industry in one
country to another or between countries, technical information relating to design,
engineering, manufacturing and production techniques for hardware systems using
recorded or documented information of a scientific or technical nature. Technology
includes intellectual property (IP). Intellectual property covers a broad range of
managerial and technical knowledge and expertise, and includes inventions, patented or
not, trademarks, industrial designs, copyrights and technical information including
software, data, designs, technical know-how, manufacturing information and know-
how, techniques, technical data packages, manufacturing data packages and trade
secrets. Intellectual property rights (IPR) has been defined as "the rights to use or
have used IP, and include rights derived from patents, trademarks, trademarks,
copyrights, industrial designs, contract clauses, disclosure in confidence techniques, or
other means of control of IP." [Ref 34: pp. 13-18 - 13-30]
A patent is a grant of certain monopoly rights conferred by a government on
an inventor by virtue of his invention and enforceable for a certain period of time, and
only within the territorial limits of the country in which it was granted. The monopoly
granted to the patentee excludes others from making or using the invention by enabling
the patentee to bring suit for infringement. In this sense, a patent cannot prevent
infringement, but it does provide for redress.
The other major right usually granted in a technology transfer is know-how.
Know-how is a generic term, embracing everything necessary to implement the transfer
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objective exclusive of patents and trade marks. Included may be trade secrets,
manufacturing process and techniques, specifications, charts, formulae, drawings and
blueprints, marketing techniques, and professional advice. The list is exhaustive.
Essential to the value of know-how is that it not be readily known or available to the
public.
a. U.S. Technology Transfer Process
Technology transfer is involved in many acquisitions in Turkey today. The
main partners of Turkey on technology transfer issues are the Western aUies (especially
the U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany). The U.S. has the most public (and
probably most carefully reviewed) policy process of any nation supplying arms
technology as well as a strongly moralistic tone to its policies [Ref 43: p. 3]. Most
technology-source nations stress only their own domestic situation and diplomatic
goals when considering technology transfer opportunities; one Reagan administration
official said the major Western allies of the U.S. "approach arms sales primarily as a
commercial matter" [Ref 44]. But the U.S. decides not only how the potential transfer
affects its security, but also if it is the "morally right" thing to do. The U.S. also
considers whether the country can actually absorb the technology in a useful way.
[Ref 43: p. 3]
In 1969, the "Nixon Doctrine" or "Gaum Declaration" was the first policy
on transferring technology in the U.S.. This doctrine held that the United States
should establish regional security by persuading countries in the developing world
(especially in the Far and Near East) to become "clients" of the United States. These
countries would receive material aid from the U.S. government, although they
essentially would be on their own in terms of maintaining their defense. Consequently,
the U.S. would be providing these countries with weapons and production know-how.
[Ref. 45: pp. 660-681]
Carter's policy directive (PD-13) espoused traditional American ideals and
gave an explicitly moralizing tone to U.S. arms technology transfers and arms sales.
Carter wanted to limit arms and technology transfers. The directive also banned most
coproduction agreements with the Third World. His declaration however, was not
followed (e.g. there were still massive arms sales to Iran) [Ref 46: pp. 40-47]. President
Reagan renounced the moralistic Carter doctrine on arms sales. Technology transfer in
general is a major concern of the Reagan administration. [Ref 43: p. 8]
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Under the Export Administration Act of 1965, as amended by the Equal
Export Opportunity Act, the U.S. Department of Commerce has licensing jurisdiction
over commodities and unclassified technical data except for certain specified items by
the U.S. National Disclosure Policy, International Traffic in Arms Regulation, Arms
Export Control Act, Export Administration Regulation and other statuton,- or
administrative policies. Some factors that are considered concerning technology
transfer and information disclosures are:
• Releasability of classified information,
• Releasability of sensitive advanced technology,
• Arrangements and agreements for handling intellectual property rights.
When these factors are not resolved early on, they can be expected to result in
problems with technology transfer.
The U.S. National Disclosure Policy provides that classified military
infonnation is a national security asset. The basic disclosure policy was issued in 1971
by the National Security Council with Presidential approval. Under the policy, the
Secretaries of State and Defense are jointly responsible for controlling the disclosure of
classified military information to foreign entities. The basic policy governs the
disclosure of militar>' information. Such miUtary information is information under the
control of, or primary interest to, the DOD and its departments or agencies and which
requires protection in the interest of national security. In this context, disclosure refers
to a foreign government or an international organization, such as NATO. The most
important aspect of the policy is that classified military information is a national
security asset, an asset that must be conserved and protected, but which may be shared
with foreign governments and international organizations. However, this asset is
shared only when there is a clearly defined advantage to the U.S. . Before deciding to
disclose classified military information, five objectives must be satisfied:
• The first is that the disclosure must be consistent with the U.S. foreign policy
toward the recipient nation or organization,
• The second objective is that the disclosure must not seriously jeopardize the
miUtary security of the U.S.,
• The third pohcy consideration is the assessment of the foreign recipient's ability
to give the information substantially the same degree of security projection that
the U.S. gives it. This is designed to reduce the risk, in sharing information.
The DOD is responsible for negotiating these agreements, which it does
through the U.S. Embassies,
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• The benefits to the U.S. must be at least equivalent to the value of the
information disclosed,
• The last consideration is whether the information to be provided is sufficiently
liniited only to that which is necessar>' to accomplish the purpose of disclosure.
[Ref 34: pp. 13.18-13.30]
The first step in the technology transfer process is often the licensing
agreement wliich generally provides for a technical data package (TDP) and technical
assistance for the licensee to produce a portion or all of the system to the performance
standard achieved by the licensor. Licensing agreements, involving the export of
hardware and technology, may require approval by the appropriate government
agencies. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 dealing with the export of ammunition and
implements of war, Export Administration Acts of 1965 and 1979 applying to exports
not covered by the Mutual Security Act and estabUshing the requirement for the
Militarily Critical Technologies are applicable.
The International TrafTic In Arms Regulations (ITAR) is a State
Department regulation which implements the Mutual Security Act. Section 414 of this
Act provides that the President is authorized to control the export and import of arms,
ammunitions and implements of war, including the technical data relating thereto. The
Act further specifies that all persons engaging in such trade must register with the
appropriate Government agency. The munitions hst is contained in the ITAR and
includes twenty-two categories of articles such as firearms, artillery and projectiles, and
ammunition. If an item is on the munitions list, an export license is required for its
sale, for the granting of the rights to manufacture the item and technical assistance
pertaining to it, and for the export of technical data related to it. An export license
may cover all or some of these categories. As such, the export Ucensing on a particular
program may involve a single license or a series of licenses.




• Transfer of ostensibly civilian technology (dual-use military and civilian),
• "High politics". The U.S. will offer technology to a developing country, usually
in conjunction with a head of state's visit or as an incentive to take a difilcult
diplomatic step. [Ref, 43: p. 11]
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Figure G.l (See Appendix G) illustrates the general process of U.S.
technology transfer.
To obtain a license for an item on the munitions list, the Turkish
Government should apply to the U.S. State Department. The State Department
request DOD formally comment within 20 days on the advisability of granting the
license. An application for export of a U.S. Munitions List article follows the sequence
depicted in Figure G.l through G.l. (See Appendix G).
b. Technology Transfer Policy of West Germany
Federal Republic of Germany is one of the two most important arms trade
partners of Turkey. Most of the Turkish naval vessels and army weapons are being
produced under German Ucense today. Even though German arms trade statistics
show low figures, this is mainly due to the fact that West German arms producers, in
response to legal restrictions on arms exports, have characteristically sought to set up
production facilities in developing countries. Since the 1970s, West Germany's role in
the world arms sector has been a supplier of know-how and technology. This coincides
with wishes of most developing countries to establish their own arms industries.
[Ref 43: pp. 53-67]
c. Technology Transfer Policy of France
France today is the world's thind largest arms exporter, and certainly one of
the leading countries exporting arms technology to developing countries. The French
government decided that exports were necessary to build and then maintain the
greatest possible range of domestically produced armaments. Today, France's arms
industry is highly dependent on export sales. France's technology transfer poUcy is
very liberal. Most of the arms producing developing countries received highly
sophisticated military technology from France. [Ref 43: pp. 23-41]
B. COPRODUCTION
1. Definition
According to The Management of Security Assistance {MSA) published by
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM); coproduction is a
method whereby product manufacture and assembly are shared between the U.S. and
foreign producers. A coproduction project may be limited to the assembly of a few
items with a small input of domestic parts, or may be a major manufacturing effort
requiring the buildup of capital industries. Coproduction enables an eligible foreign
government, international organization, or designated foreign commercial producer to
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acquire the technology to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain and operate, in
whole or part, a specific weapon, communications or support system, or an individual
military' item. [Ref 34: p. 13-5]
A second definition differentiates the difTerence between coproduction and
licensed production. With licensed production, the foreign nation builds its own orders
only. Coproduction contracts allow the foreign nation a share of partner nation's
orders, domestic production and third party sales [Ref. 47: p. 124].
Another definition, from the Rand Corporation states that: coproduction
includes any international collaboration during the production phase of a major
weapon system acquisition program. Most of these collaborative arrangements fall
into three major classes:
• Fully integrated production, in which each participating nation purchases the
same system and produces parts of each other's units,
• Foreign production, under license, of a U.S. design,
• U.S. production, under license, of a foreign design [Ref. 48; pp. 1-2].
A fourth definition is that coproduction is an agreement between governments
that permit a foreign government or a producer to acquire the technical information to
manufacture all or part of a U.S. origin defense article overseas. It includes
government-to-government licensed production. It excludes licensed production based
upon direct commercial arrangements by U.S. manufacturers [Ref 49).
In this thesis coproduction is defined to be the result of government-to-
government agreements; a contract which is signed by two or more nations' firms that
allows the foreign nation to share the other government's orders, domestic production
and third party sales. The terms of coproduction may include industrial collaboration,
work sharing and offset agreements. A nation purchasing a foreign system may obtain
some production work, usually on its own aircraft or weapon. For example, many
European states have been involved in an industrial collaboration program which
provided them with some of the work for their jointly produced AWACS aircraft.
Similarly, the British purchase of 170 U.S. F-4 Phantoms in 1965 incorporated a work-
sharing arrangement whereby United Kingdom (UK) industry was allocated about fifty
percent of the value of its national order. Finally, nations purchasing a foreign aircraft
might negotiate an offset under which the original manufacturer will offer to allocate
an agreed proportion of work to the buyer, usually sub-contract business which could
be on a completely different project [Ref. 47: pp. 124,125]. Joint or collaborative
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ventures involve two or more nations agreeing to share the development and
production costs of a new project. Collaboration is undertaken where independence is
regarded as "too costly", usually because of the scale of R & D required (or "too risky"
in the case of civil projects). Consideration of the range of collaborative ventures
provides an indication of the scale and type of project which some nations can no
longer afford to undertake alone (supersonic airlines, space satellites, complex strike
aircraft etc.). Such joint projects enable a nation to retain its domestic defense industry
and reap the benefits of continued involvement in high technology work. In this form,
collaboration resembles a club, with a small group of nations combining to purchase a
set of benefits (e.g. technology, weapons, jobs) which each would be unwilling to
finance independently. [Ref. 47: p. 140]
2. Advantages of Coproduction
a. Technology Transfer
Coproduction agreements would provide Turkey with modern militar>'
technology through technology transfer. Technology transfer is the process of
transferring, from the industry in one country to the industry of another, technical
design information, engineering, manufacturing and production techniques for
hardware system. Engineering and management experience and expertise gained
through coproduction could have an important impact on the Turkish defense industry.
This may be the most important reason why coproduction is preferred over the
technical data package (TDP) approach. In coproduction, technology transfer takes
place face-to-face with the original system developer. With the technical data package
technique, Turkey cannot expect any direct consultation with the originator. For
example, if Turkey had intended to accomplish the F-16 project with TDP, it would
have been impossible for Turkey to produce the aircraft because of lack of aircraft
production knowledge and experience within the Turkish industry.
b. Unit Cost Savings
Because of the increase in real weapon costs and limited defense budgets,
new weapons purchased by nations decrease year by year. Even in the United States,
purchases of tactical aircraft have declined from some 3000 per year in the 1950s to
about 300 per year in the 1970s [Ref 47: p. 31]. This results in fewer opportunities for
economies of scale in production. Weapon costs vary depending on the production
quantity. Two participant countries' orders and third party sales can create enough
production capacity to have economies of scale. Economies of scale are one of the
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major sources of cost savings, resulting in reductions in unit production cost when a
firm is able to increase in size by var3ring ail its factors of production. Economies of
scale arise from technical factors associated with larger scale plants, such as the
division of labor and specialization; centralization of plant and machinery or from
economies in management, R&D, marketing and finance [Ref 50]. Once scale
economies are exhausted, unit cost cease to faU and this point defmes the optimum size
of the firm. Standard economic theory predicts that further expansion of finn size
beyond the optimum wiil encounter dis-economies of scale and rising unit cost
[Ref. 47: pp. 43,44]. Figure 4.1 illustrates the economies and diseconomies of scale
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U-shaped scale curve. The declining portion of the long-run
average cost (LAC) curve shows economies of scale; the rising portion reflects
dis-economies.
Figure 4. 1 Average Cost Curve and Economies of Scale [Ref 47: p. 4].
In reality, the scale curves (resulting from studies in the U.K., Western
Europe, and the U.S.) are L-shaped, sloping downwards at first and then tending to
become horizontal. The point at which the curve becomes horizontal defines the
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Figure 4.2 Economies of Scale in Reality [Ref, 47: p. 45].
Beyond the MES there are relatively few further cost savings. For example,
consider various nations operating at different points on the scale curve in Figure 4.2.
In the case of aerospace, output Q^ approximates the requirements of such European
states as Belgium, Italy and Norway (100 units each), while Q2 could be Britain,
France, Germany (200-400 each), with Q^ representing the U.S.A. (1000+ units) and
Q4 might be the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact (5000+ units). Operating in the range
Qj to Q2 results in considerably high costs compared with producing at Q^. In this
example, the factors of production for the nations are assumed to be identical
[Ref 47: pp. 44,45]. Turkish aircraft production is now less than Q^ in Figure 4.2.
Thus, the average cost of a Turkish F-I6 will be higher than any other European
country's aircraft. Therefore, if Turkey increases production capacity, it will create
economies of scale and will lower the average weapon cost.
In general, coproduction unit cost is expected to be lower than independent
production. A case in point, Japan-U.S. coproduction of F-104J aircraft were
estimated to cost thirty to one-hundred percent higher than the U.S.-produced aircraft
due to the higher cost of certain items in Japan; however, Japanese coproduced F-I04J
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costs have been about ten percent less than U.S.-produced aircraft because of low
labor cost and some learning advantages [Ref 5\].
c. R & D Cost Savings
Costs savings from Research and Development (R&D) projects is another
advantage of coproduction. Average R&D costs show a similar pattern with a larger
production resulting in lower average R&D cost (See Figure 4.3). Coproduction will
also prevent the duplication of R & D efforts. Different nations may spend
considerable amounts of money on the same R&D projects. With coproduction
nations can share the R&D costs. In Figure 4.4, coproduction is also cheaper at C^
per unit since the buyer is assumed to save on R & D cost compared with independent
production. [Ref 47: pp. 93-96]
d. Standavdi'Mtinn
One of the purposes of coproduction programs among North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) nations is to realize the NATO Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) program [Ref 52]. Coproduction activities
will create standardization among NATO nations. In addition to its benefits in NATO
military operations in the field, standardization is believed to offer reductions in the
unit costs of weapons. Cost savings from standardization may be in reduction of
duplication and overlap in R & D work or savings from production costs through
economies of scale. These two sources of savings were discussed above (cost savings
from duplication and overlap in R & D work, cost saving from economies of scale).
Another advantage which could be gained from standardization would be
trade benefits, if NATO countries lifted their quota restrictions. The benefits would be
that each NATO member would specialize in those parts of the weapons development
and production process in which it has a comparative advantage (i.e. what it does
best). In this way it would reap the gains from international specialization and
mutually advantageous trade and exchange. In this situation it is necessary to
determine the relative position of the cost curves between nations to find which NATO
countries have comparative advantage for which weapons and what are the possible
magnitudes of such cost differences. Some other issues become relevant to answer
these questions. They are determining minimum efficient plant scale for each kind of
weapon, labor rates and productivity in different countries, and prices of other major
sources. [Ref 47: pp. 45-67]
60
Unit R&D costs. R&D costs are fixed; hence an increase in
output means that such costs are spread over a greater volume, so reducing
unit R&D costs. This assume a given R&D cost curve, which remains
unchanged after 'wasteful duplication' (competition?) has been eliminated.
The expected reductions in unit R&D costs might not occur if monopoly is
associated with inefficiency (i.e. a shift to a higher cost curve).
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Figure 5.1 The costs of alternative policies: a simplified example. This simple
example is based on a single cost curve, with unit cost differences reflecting
variations in the scale of output - i.e. spreading of R & D costs and scale
economies, plus learning.





The maximum savings from standardisation. This shows the ideal
case in which standardisation results in the exploitation of scale economies and
of gains from free trade.
Figure 4.5 The Maximum Savings from Standardization [Ref. 47: p. 47].
Figure 4.5 illustrates the maximum savings from standardization. In Figure
4.5, there are two nations: nation A (assumed tlie U.S.) and nation B (assumed
Turkey). Tlie Long Run Average Curve (LAC) of nation A is represented by LACj,
and the LAC for nation B is represented by LACj. International dilferences in
productivity and wage rates determine a nation's LAC. If nation A's productivity is
twice nation B's but its wage rates are three times as great, then unit costs will be
lower in B. For illustration purposes, it is assumed that Turkish labor rates are one
third of the U.S. rates, and that the U.S. productivity rate is twice the Turkish
productivity rate. Labor rates, cost of living in the U.S. and in TurKcy, labor
unionization, productivity, devaluation of Turkish Liras against the dollar and some
other social factors are considered to make this assumption. Initially, nation A (the
U.S.) is at the cost-output position C2-Q2 on LACj, while country B (Turkey) is at
Cj-Qj on LAC^: country B is the lower cost supplier and can produce Q2 at C^. If B
specializes and produces both Qj and Q^.equal to Q3, its unit costs will be Cq. There
are potential unit cost savings for B of C3 - Cq, and for A of Cj - C^. Figure 4.5 also
shows that under independence, nation B can achieve the same unit costs as A at
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output levels lower than Q2 (i.e. Qj^) gives unit costs of C-, for country B.
[Ref 47: pp. 46-47]
Studies by economists Keith Hartley concluded that weapons procurement
standardization in NATO could result in unit cost savings of 20-30 percent [Ref 47: p.
67].
e. Defense Industry Benefits
Defense industries are characterized by high technology (e.g. aerospace,
electronics, shipbuilding, vehicles, etc.). High technology is a continuous process.
Buying abroad disrupts the accumulation of knowledge and creates a technology gap
which is costly to remove if ever the nation wishes to re-enter the field. Basically
today's Turkish aircraft production problems stem from this phenomena. A domestic
defense industry will contribute to the balance of payments through import savings and
export earnings. It also provides a national source of supply which contributes to
increased security and some independence in foreign policy. Dependence on a foreign
monopoly can be avoided, which otherwise might lead to higher prices of equipment
and spares, as well as weapons not designed for national requirements. Further
benefits from a domestic industry include greater control over a project and its
continuation, as well as freedom to export to the rest of the world [Ref 53: pp. 4-49].
/. Offset Benefits
Coproduction agreements generally provide offset benefits to the recipient
country. These offset benefits would have significant impact on the Turkish economy.
The term offset refers to a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices
required as a condition of sale for military-related exports [Ref 49: p. 187]. Offsets can
be direct or indirect. Direct offsets allow for compensation in related goods,
permitting a foreign country to produce in country certain components or subsystems
of a weapon systems it is buying from a U.S. supplier as a condition of the sale
[Ref 54: p. 54]. Indirect offsets are associated with goods unrelated to the defense item
being sold. The supplier agrees to purchase a certain dollar value of the buyer's
manufactured products, raw materials, or serv'ices as a condition of the sale
[Ref 49: pp. 183-188]. Many countries are using offset agreements to encourage
economic growth, industrialization and gain domestic political support.
g. Job Opportunities
The most important benefit of coproduction and other kinds of national
arms production is to provide job opportunities for the nation. Since the Turkish
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economy may be confronted with major unemployment problems during the 1980s, it is
likely that the job opportunities might dominate decisions about domestic production.
If the purchase of weapons from a Turkish supplier or joint venture had the effect of
reducing the level of Turkish unemployment, the net cost to Turkey of buying more
expensive domestic equipment (i.e. the price of the equipment, additional tax payments,
social benefits saved...) could well be less than the net cost associated with the
purchase of cheaper foreign equipment. In these circumstances, the government
should, in comparing the cost of domestic and foreign weapons before buying, add to
the price of the foreign equipment a premium (like a tariff) whose size would depend
on assessments of the Turkish labor market because, if the weapon were produced in
Turkey, it would decrease the Turkish unemployment rate.
The opportunity cost for labor of buying weapons from outside is:^
Opportunity cost for labor = N * M * D " C
where N is the total direct employment per year if the weapon were produced in
Turkey, and M is the employment multiplier to allow for direct and indirect
employment effects. D is the number of years or duration of the project, and C is the
annual Exchequer cost-^ of unemployment [Ref 47: pp. 71-86]. As an example,
assume that a Turkish buy creates 10,000 jobs per year; that the employment multiplier
is about 2; that project duration is ten years; and that the Exchequer costs of
unemployment are S 1,000 per person per year (1987 prices). The estimate of
unemployment costs includes lost tax receipts and insurance contributions, retirement
contributions, rent and rates rebates and administration costs. As a result, the
estimated opportunity cost of labor is S200 million. This means Turkey would lose
S200 million due to not buying arms from domestic suppliers. Accordingly, the
European F-16 coproduction program is often justified in terms of its jobs and
technology benefits. The original European choice of the F-16 was partly based on a
certainty of 29,000 man-years of work in Europe. There is a probability of additional
employment depending on export sales. Assuming a six year program, the guaranteed
29,000 man-years of work provided about 5,000 jobs between 1979 and 1985
[Ref 47: pp. 134,135].
This formula and its explanation was adapted from Keith Hartley, and D.
Greenwood.
^Indirect social cost of unemployment
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h. Maintenance and Operational Support Benefits
Domestic production simplifies maintenance and operational support of
military equipment and assures a war time supply. For example, European industry
often claims that U.S. aerospace equipment sold abroad is cheap, but "you pay for the
spares". Some U.S. firms readily sold aircraft abroad but raised the prices of spares on
later orders, 15-20 percent higher than for sales to the American government. The
explanations for this policy were diverse. They included the search for higher profit
rates, the fact that exports involve greater risks, or specific requirements which are
costlier due to shorter runs, or because foreigners often buy spares at the end of
production run, or require them urgently, and a U.S. government policy which imposes
a levy on foreign military sales [Ref 47: pp. 116-120]. Domestic production of spare
parts will contribute to a high maintainability, rehability and availability level for
Turkish equipment at a lower cost.
/. Political Benefits
Coproduction strengthens the relations between governments. According
to a Rand Corporation's report for the U.S. Air Force (U.S.A. F.), coproduction has
often been credited with strengthening ties within NATO [Ref 48: p. 4]. Some people
argue that what the United States gets from coproduction is allies [Ref 55].
j. Military Benefits
Coproduction has many military advantages. Most of the military analysts
believe that in the event of war, operational and logistics support would become a
nightmare without standardization in NATO [Refs. 56,57: pp. 12,627]. Coproduction
makes operational and logistics support easier by creating standardization among
nations. Another military advantage of coproduction is security. Coproduction
increases the security of the United States and its allies by encouraging multinational
acceptance of strategic and tactical concepts and doctrine through the utilization of
common military material [Refs. 57,58: pp. 196,220]. Another militar}' advantage of
coproduction is that nations procure better quality products because coproduction
draws on the combined skills of several nations.
Among the military advantages of coproduction, standardization and
interoperability are considered the most important [Refs. 59,60,61,: pp. 7,1-7,1]. In the
author's opinion, the most important military advantage of coproduction from the
Turkish point of view is that coproduction will make Turkish Armed Forces less
dependent on foreign sources for materials and support. Thus the Turkish response
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capability and individual sustainability and surviveability as a nation vdW be
strengthened.
3. Disadvantages of Coproductioii
a. Military Technology and National Economy Trade-ojfs
There are many advantages of technology transfer such as to create
indigenous defense industries, to enhance economic development and to improve
employment opportunities, etc. However, it does have its disadvantages. Most
military technology is non-productive, that is, it contributes relatively little to the
overall national economy of nations. While some of the equipment of military forces is
adaptable to civilian uses, much of it is not. The growth of militar>' forces and
accompanying increases in domestic military expenditures may stimulate growth
through increased demand, but may also add to inflation. [Ref 53: pp. 15-48J
b. High Initial Investments and Total Cost
The high initial investments for coproduction facilities and machinery may
require considerable amounts of foreign credit, and this means additional external debt
and hard currency problems. This may worsen the Turkish foreign trade deficit
problem. All coproduction arrangements which involve transfers of technology and
having modern technology are not without cost. On the surface, the cost of acquiring
technology for production is the contractual license fees, or royalties. These fees
generally cover acquisition of technical data, some engineering assistance, and the
production rights. However, there are some additional costs incurred by the transferee
in preparing for full-scale production of the licensed item. These additional costs
generally fall into five categories: (1) data transfer, (2) design adaptation due to
requirements differences, (3) parts selection and qualification, (4) changes due to
differences in manufacturing methods, and (5) testing. [Ref 48: p. 54]
c. Increased Military Pay and Technology Absorption Problems
In order to operate and maintain modern military' equipment special skills
are needed. These skills often require expensive training and technical experience.
These military technical skills are readily transferable to the civilian economy. As a
result, Turkey may be unable to hold these highly trained militar>' personnel without
significant pay increases. This would mean increased government expenditures and
further inflation.
The common solution to this problem is to hire foreign technical
representatives. However, this is a temporary solution and does not make any lasting
contribution to the national economy, labor force, or military infrastructure.
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Because modern military weapon systems generally require high
technological skills, Turkey may experience some technology absorption problems. It
either may become dependent upon large numbers of "white-collar mercenaries" to
maintain and operate new weapon systems, or may send large numbers oC trainees to
supplier nations. These are expensive solutions to the problem, and may cause
domestic political and economic difficulties [Ref. 53: p. 44]. A phenomena such as the
brain drain* may also become a problem. Some skilled and trained personnel would
have job opportunities in developed countries and they would then become a loss for
Turkey. The Turkish government should replace these personnel with foreign experts
to overcome losing its skilled personnel.
d. Suppliers Concerns
Mihtary technology has peculiar security aspects. From the point of view
of the technology providing country, the transfer of sophisticated equipment to
developing countries may become a risk. The supplier country may want to restrict its
partner country's arms sales or technology transfers to embargoed nations. Suppliers
may hesitate to provide the means to create such an indigenous and therefore
independent capacity [Ref 53: p. 44]. In the case of coproduction in Turkey however,
this situation might become a weakness for the nation which provides technology
transfer to Turkey. Because the technology providing nation has the capability of
being able to produce coproduced weapons on its own, this may result in an
unwillingness of that nation to enter into coproduction agreements. For example, the
U.S. Army's concern of being dependent on foreign sources is illustrated by their
willingness to use the European-developed Roland only if it is produced in the United
States. The reason for this is that "it would be militarily unacceptable for the Army
(U.S. Army) to be forced to rely on a foreign producer; in the event of war it might be
deprived of crucial deliveries" [Refs. 57,60: pp. 665-669,46].
There are also some problems transferring the data. In reality, potential
licensors have historically provided very limited data on the system of interest before a
license agreement is signed. The restraint stems largely from a concern that premature
disclosure could enable the potential licensee to produce an improved version of a
design without formally entering into a licensee arrangement. Licensors have generally
tried to provide licensees enough data to enter a paper design competition and make
preliminary cost estimates, but not enough to produce the design. Such samples of
'^Transferring highly trained personnel from one country to another.
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technical data (usually of block diagrams and functional descriptions) rarely reflect the
quality and size of the entire data package. For example, original Roland program
plans called for about 25,000 documents to be delivered within 30 days; in ail, the
process involved about six times as many documents (many delivered out of sequence)
and took well over four years to complete [Ref 48: pp. 54-55].
e. Overall Appropriateness
There is the important question of the overall appropriateness of the
weapons themselves in regard to their military capability and technology. Do they
really add to the military capability, or are they just prestige weapons to produce?
When the production project is finished, is it still an appropriate military technology or
is it obsolete already? [Ref 53: p. 45]. For example, if Turkey could produce an
aircraft to replace its aging aircraft in its inventory, an objective would be to ultimately
have more modem and capable aircraft. If the aircraft to be produced (say F-104) is
already obsolete at the time of delivery (say 1995), this weapon is inappropriate even if
it is 100 percent Turkish. So, at the time of delivery, coproduced weapons should be
still modern and there should be enough international demand to be able to export
these products.
/. Opportunity Cost
The opportunity cost of coproduction is another disadvantage. The
resources used to produce weapons could be used in the civihan sector. The
development of arms industries often detract from general industrialization by diverting
investment, skilled personnel, and other resources. Once devoted, these resources can
not be converted to the civilian sector. The opportunity costs of retooling, retraining,
and so on, would be as excessive as they were originally when the defense industries
were created [Ref 53: pp. 22-47]. However, because of the high unemployment rate in
Turkey, the opportunity cost of labor will be lower. Turkey's already obsolete
equipment requires replacement or at least modernization, therefore, the money that
Turkey should spend on this equipment can be accepted as a sunk cost.
g. International Market Considerations
To operate economically, indigenous defense industries must seek export
markets to subsidize high initial costs and to lower the individual end-item cost for
their own forces. This means that there will be a continuing proliferation of arms
suppliers in an already crowded and highly competitive marketplace. Many countries
borrow military sales credits whenever it is possible because of the financial leverage
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that borrowing provides. Thus, most of the arms transfers are carried out on a credit
or loan basis [Ref 53: pp. 20-48]. Turkey has already had hard currency or credit
problems, so it is difficult for Turkey to compete against big arms suppliers. This may
lead Turkey to find its markets in oil-producing, embargoed, or pariah states who can
afford to buy its arms in cash. This is in conflict with the Turkish traditional foreign
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The costs of alternative policies: a simplified example. This simple
example is based on a single cost curve, with unit cost differences reflecting
variations in the scale of output - i.e. spreading of R & D costs and scale
economies, plus learning.
Figure 4.6 The Costs of Alternative Policies [Ref 47: p. 94].
h. Higher Unit Cost than those of "off the shelf
It is believed that coproduction results in higher costs than if the weapons
had been purchased directly "off the shelf' from the original manufacturer. Higher
costs for coproduction might result from shorter production runs and loss of learning
economies, duplicate tooling and the costs of transferring technology. As an
illustration (See Figure 4.6), assume that two (or more) coproduction partner nations
have a given and identical cost curve with unit cost differences reflecting variations in
the scale of output. R&D and production costs are represented by the long-run
average cost curve, LAC^. A nation requires 200 units of an aircraft. Coproduction is
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cheaper than national production. Collaboration with equal sharing and a total output
of 400 units would involve unit costs of Cj- In contrast, a purchase of 200 units from
an existing production run of 1200 (e.g. an "off the shelf buy from the U.S.) will result
in unit costs of C^.
One study has estimated that the F-16 coproduction program costs the
European nations eighteen percent more than if they had purchased the aircraft
directly from the U-So. It has also been estimated that, as a result of coproduction, the
U.S.A. F. will pay some 3-8 percent more for their F-16s. Under coproduction of the
European F-16, the European F-16 has higher cost than acquiring F-16s directly from

































Unit part set price' (thousands of dollars)
Ratio of average price to USAF, current 998 aircraft coproduction program, to average price
to USAF, hypothetical all-domestic 650 aircraft program. Value greater than t.O denotes part
set that is more expensive when coproducad.
> Average price to USAF, hypothetical all-domestic program (1975 dollar*)
Figure 4.7 Unit Costs of European F-16's Parts [Ref 48: p. 107].
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/. Militmy Disadvantages
There are some niilitar\' disadvantages to coproduction through creating
standardization among NATO nations. In some cases, standardization might make it
easier for the U.S.S.R. to counter NATO capabihties than it would a variety of
different systems [Ref 62: pp. 35-36]. Also, systems will often fall short of individual
operational requirements since it is sometimes difficult to reach agreement on
requirements among all the countries. Some fear that collaboration will produce
systems so distorted by negotiations and compromise that they represent no one's first
choice [Ref 56: pp. 12,22]. Lastly, it is expected that products will generally take
longer to field as a result of partnerships, more subcontractors, more production lines,
more requirements, and more schedule sHppage as well as conflicts over system
specifications delaying the start of the program [Refs. 56,63: pp. 12,17].
j. Program Management
Generally speaking, coproduction programs do proceed slowly. The main
reason for this is because more than one nation is included. Each nation has its own
national goals to satisfy and its own requirements. Almost every collaborative military
aircraft program has begun with the estabUshment of a new program arrangement. It
takes considerable time to prepare these arrangements. The uncertainty surrounding
the begirming of collaborative programs can actually extend far into a program. The
Roland program is an example of this. The flow of documents from Europe to the
U.S. early in the program slowed until negotiations among the three countries (the U.S.
France, Germany), could resolve the problems [Ref 64: pp. 46-47, 89].
Making decisions using multinational committees require more time.
Sometimes three-way or two-way negotiations may cause further delay in coproduction
program. Perhaps the most vexing and time-consuming issue facing multinational
committees is the distribution of the design, development, or production work, the
means by which the individual program participants seek to achieve their diverse
industrial and economic objectives. Delays can come from four sources: (1) difficulties
in identifying qualified contractors; (2) difficulties in negotiating the distribution of
work or work packages among the program participants to fulfill program objectives;
(3) inefficiencies in design, development, or production introduced by collaborative
work packages; and (4) the occasional need to transfer work across national boundaries
to satisfy program equity considerations. The severity of the delays depend in great
part on the program structure and the objectives of the program participants.
[Ref 48: pp. 45,46]
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Another reason for slow coproduction is that collaborative programs
commonly involve the production of systems having different configurations to satisfy
the needs of each participating countr}'. Production of systems having different
configurations can require additional tooling and fabrication and assembly procedures.
Interleaving of systems having different configurations on assembly lines can reduce
production learning and complicate the introduction of modifications on the assembly
line. Past experience illustrates the desirability of the governments specifying the type
and degree of standardization being sought before a technology transfer program gets
underway. Therefore different dehvery requirements of nations is another reason for
slow dehvery. Nations might want procurement schedules as soon as possible or they
might also alter their procurement plans after programs get underway for the
budgetary or other reasons [Ref 48: pp. 42-43].
C. TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE (TDP)
1. Definition
Before defining technical data package (TDP), technical data should be
defmed. Technical data are recorded information used to defme a design and to
produce, support, maintain or operate items of defense material. These data may be
recorded as graphic or pictorial dehneations in media such as drawings or photographs;
text in specifications or related performance or design type documents; in machine
forms such as punched cards, magnetic tape, computer memory printouts; or may be
retained in computer memory. Examples of recorded information include engineering
drawings and associated lists, specifications, standards, process sheets, manuals,
technical reports, catalog item identifications, and related information. [Ref 65]
Technical data package is a collection of technical data products (items) which
is complete for a specific use. The term also generally refers to the category of
intended use where the item, with modifications, is one planned for multi-year usage
and will involve several supply production contracts. Generally, full design disclosure
data^ and procurement data^ are required. [Ref 65: p. 56]
Full Design Disclosure Data is information complete to the extent necessary to
support a procurement or permit manufacture without additional design effort, and
without recourse to the original design activity.
Procurement Data Package is a collection of all necessary for procurement of the
items which it pertains, e.g. engineering drawings, specifications, manufacturing
information essential to production, and test procedures.
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Technical data package is a technique of establishing a second source for
production. This method involves utilization of a stand-alone technical data package
(TDP) to solicit proposals from manufacturers who may not have been involved in the
initial development of the system or in initial production. This method assumes that
the data package alone is sufficient to allow production of the system by alternative
manufacturers. [Ref 66: p. 13]
The Government should procure the technical data package from the original
developer in order to reproduce an end item or to have second sources produce it.
This involves technology transfer either from foreign sources or domestic sources. An
adequate TDP defines the following aspects of the end item:
• Specific requirements of the product in terms of detailed physical and
performance characteristics within the operational environment for which the
product is intended,
• Quality assurance provisions, including sampling plans and acceptance criteria,
acceptance inspection equipment, examinations, and tests to be conducted,
• Preservation, packaging, and packing to ensure adequate and economical
preparation for delivery and protection of the product from the time of
production to time of deployment,
• Manufacturing instructions and descriptions to ensure that contractors in the
general field of capability can expeditiously initiate production of the item
covered by the TDP. [Ref. 67: p. 2-5]
In this thesis, the technical data package term is defined as any collection of
technical data which is sufficient to allow production of the system by alternative
manufacturers in Turkey or outside of Turkey for Turkish Armed Forces orders.
2. Data Rights
Data Rights are a relevant issue in the application of the TDP methodology.
A definition of data rights from the Acquisition Strategy Guide (Defense System
Management College) states that data rights are the limitations placed on the
government in using technical data delivered as part of a contract. There are two basic
forms of data rights:
• Unlimited Rights: The right to use, duplicate or disclose technical data in whole
or in part in any manner and for any purpose whatsoever, and to direct or
permit others to do so.
• Limited Rights: The right of the government, or others on behalf of the
government, to use, duplicate, or disclose data, but not outside the government
without written permission.
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The government has a legitimate need for data to support such functions as
operation, maintenance training, standardization, and logistics support. Of priman.-
concern is the purchase of data to provide the capability to produce the item by
sources other than the original manufacturer which is usually called a technical data
package ^TDP). [Ref 68: p. 5-18]
3. Advantages of Technical Data Package (TDP)
a. Competition
Using a TDP, a government can estabhsh more than one production
source. The obvious advantage of this is achieving the potential for competition for
out-year buys [Ref 68: p. 5-19]. A TDP can be used repeatedly in maintaining a
competitive atmosphere throughout the production phase of the acquisition [Ref 66: p.
14]. Once the complete TDP is procured, the Turkish Government can use second
sourcing techniques to create competition among domestic sources and foreign sources.
Competition can also provide an incentive for contractors to reduce unit costs, and
improve the quality and performance levels of their systems.
b. Reduced Dependence on a Single Manufacturer
A second advantage lies in reducing dependence on a single manufacturer
for equipment, spare items, training, overhaul, and other activities for which detailed
design and production might be important [Ref 68: p. 5-19].
c. Elimination of Original Source
Once the TDP is validated and has proved adequate for production of the
system, the mechanics of second sourcing are relatively simple. There need not be any
contract between production sources and it is even possible to eliminate the original
source ahogether. [Ref 66: p. 14]
d. Defense Industry Benefits
Once the TDP is proved adequate for production and production of system
can be accomplished, it will create job opportunities for Turkey. This will contribute
to the balance of payments through import savings. By using domestic production
sources, maintenance and operational support of the system produced will be easy and
economic.
4. Disadvantages of Technical Data Package (TDP)
a. Most Hazardous Second Sourcing Methodology
Although theoretically sound, the TDP method is perhaps the most
hazardous of all the second-sourcing methodologies. It is not well-suited for use in
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highly complex systems or systems with unstable design or technologies. Experience
has shown that drawings and specifications alone are often insufficient to secure
effective transfer of manufacturing technology in these instances [Ref 66: p. 14]. The
Turkish Government may have a lot of difficulties in obtaining a complete and
accurate TDP that is free of defects and that, when followed, will yield a qualified
product. Even if the TDP is accurate, it is extremely difficult to transfer complex
technologies. Transfer of technologies are often impossible without the benefit of
engineering liaison between the sources of production. The reason for this would be
that some critical factors such as "craftsmen's skills", indigenous processes, etc., cannot
be easily documented. [Ref 66: p. 14]
b. Technological Differences
Technological differences between companies (like different process
methodologies) may be such that the second source does not have the capability to
perform in accordance with the data package [Ref 66: p. 14].
c. Legal Difficulties
Once the data package has been accepted from the developer, the
government effectively guarantees its accuracy to the second source. If the second
source discovers some defects in the TDP, as is usually the case, the second source may
have the basis for a claim against the government. Some methods of minimizing this
particular problem include requiring the producer of the data package to certify its
adequacy, preproduction evaluation by the second source, and the use of latent/patent
defects clause in the contract with the second source. Even if the original source of the
TDP is domestic, this puts the government in a precarious legal position in the event of
subsequent claims [Ref 66: p. 14]. In the case of Turkey, most TDPs will probably be
taken from foreign developers. The complexities of international laws will require
Turkish Government to think twice before buying TDP.
D. LICENSING
1. Definition
There are two kinds of Ucensing application. First, licensing agreements are
used as a technology transfer methodology. This can be accomplished by government-
to-government agreement or government-to-foreign company or Turkish company-to-
foreign company agreements. Secondly, directed licensing can be used to create
competitive production sources within the country.
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a. Licensed Production {As A Way of Transferring Technology)
According to "Management of Security Assistance" published by DISAM,
licensing, which is the oldest method of international production, is the production
technology developed in a particular countr}', transferred to a foreign manufacturer
under a formal licensing agreement which authorizes the use of the developer's data
and manufacturing technology to produce the same weapons system [Ref. 34: p. 13-15].
Another definition distinguishes the difference between licensing and
coproduction. With licensed production a nation may build its own orders only while
coproduction contracts allow a nation a share of another nation's orders, domestic
production and third party sales [Ref 47: p. 124].
Another definition is from General Research Corporation:
"Licensed production is production made possible by agreements under which
developers of military hardware provide data, patent rights, technical assistance
and whatever else is necessary to enable production of the desired hardware by a
source in another country. The developer is usually compensated by licensing
fees and/or royalties on sales and various other means". [Ref 69: p. 1]
b. Directed Licensing (As a Second Sourcing Methodology)
The term directed licensing appears frequently in domestic acquisition
literature. Licensing, as a second source methodology, creates competitive production
sources. The following definition is from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO):
"This method proposes a clause for insertion in the early development contract
allowing the government to reopen competition for subsequent or follow-on
production, select the winner, and appoint him as licensee. It is aimed at
obtaining competition in the procurement of technological hardware, which is
ordinarily very difficult to achieve. In return for royalty and technical assistance
fees, the licensor would then provide the winner with manufacturing data and
technical assistance to help the licensee produce successfully". [Ref 70: p. 2-3]
According to this definition, the Turkish government has the right to select
the licensee, and accordingly the licensor has no say in this selection process. Some
reasons for this strategy are a government's desire to have more than one production
source and to create competition on price and quality of the product. Of course, the
licensor expects to receive a fee for providing technical assistance to the licensee and a
royalty payment for each fmal product delivered to the government.
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Another definition is from Rand Corporation:
"Directed licensing consists essentially of having the government obtain from a
weapon system developer, at the time of the development contract, a contractual
commitment for rights to production data and an agreement to hcense whomever
the government designates to produce the weapon system during any or all
production runs, following the initial production by the developer. The basic
idea of directed licensing is to bring competition to bear after the uncertainties of
R&D and early production have been resolved. The developer would agree to
provide a data package and such technical assistance as may be required to get
the new contractor into production. The development contractor would be
compensated for his efforts by fees and royalties agreed upon at the time of the
initial commitment". [Ref 71: pp. V-VII]
Another defmition is from the U.S. Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR):
"A special provision included in a contract with the developer source that
specifies a firm requirement that the developer license the production of later
quantities to another source" [Ref 72: p. 4.702.4].
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The following definition summarizes the previous definitions of licensing:
"Under a licensing approach to competitive production, the system developer, in
exchange for a royalty fee, grants permission or license to another firm to
produce an end item of proprietary interest to the developer. In addition, the
system developer may provide technical assistance to the second source or
licensee in exchange for engineering fees." [Ref 67: p. 12-1]
In this thesis, there will be two licensing terms to distinguish licensed
production and directed licensing. The term "Licensing" or "Licensed Production" will
be used for government-to-government, government-to-firm or firm-to-firm
international agreements to produce a military equipment in Turkey. The term "Direct
Licensing" will be used for the acquisition strategy to establish competitive production
sources in Turkey. Whai government-to-government, Turkish government-to-foreign
company or Turkish company-to-foreign company is considered, licensed production
means: to transfer the technical data and right to produce an item for Turkish orders
only. With licensed production, Turkey builds for its own orders only. No foreign
orders are involved in licensed production. In directed licensing agreements, the
Turkish government can include a clause in the domestic developer's contract enabling
the government to conduct competition for production quantities, select a winner and
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appoint him as a licensee. The developer or licensor is directed by the government to
provide technical assistance and manufacturing daia to the licensee in exchange for
royalties or fees [Ref 67: pp. 2-13, 12-1 - 12-13]. If a licensing technique is employed,
the system developer retains rights to proprietary^ data and maintains system
responsibility. The developer grants permission to manufacture the system to the
licensee through a license agreement which normally restricts use of the technology to
the specific program [Ref. 67: p. 2-13].
2. Advantages of Licensed Production
a. Technology Transfer
With licensed production agreements, Turkey can get modem military
technology, engineering, technical design, manufacturing and management experience
and expertise not available from domestic sources. Licensing involves not only the
transfer of data from the developer to the second source, but also provides for the
transfer of manufacturing know-how. Under Ucense, Turkey can get this technology
transfer face-to-face with the original developer. This is the most important advantage
of hcensing over the TDP. There is less risk involved in manufacturing since
manufacturing technology can be implemented under the assistance of original
developer.
b. Standardization
Licensed production is another way of achieving standardization among
NATO Nations. As mentioned before, this program is called the NATO
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) program.
c. Defense Industry Benefits
Turkey can achieve some domestic defense industry benefits through
licensed production. A domestic defense industry will contribute to the balance of
payments through import-saving and offsets benefits. The domestic defense industry
also provides a national source of supply which contributes to increased security and
some independence in foreign policy. Offset benefits would result in lowering Turkish
trade deficits.
d. Job Opportunities
Licensed production will create job opportunities like coproduction. (See
pp. 63-64).
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e. Maintenance and Operational Support Benefits
(See p. 65).
f. Military and Political Benefits
(See pp. 65-66).
g. Lessened Suppliers Concerns
Transferring technology through licensed production has less problems
relative to coproduction. This is because licensed production is limited to national
orders. Transferring technology has some security concerns from the point of view of
the technology providing country. However, in licensed production agreements, the
supplier has the least concern because the hcensee has no right to transfer the
technology to other countries.
//. Delivery Schedule
Licensed production can have a better delivery record than coproduction
because only one nation is involved. Slow dehvery schedules are a disadvantage of
coproduction (See pp. 71-72).
3. Disadvantages of Licensed Production
a. High Unit Cost
With licensed production, Turkey can build its own orders only. Turkish
domestic needs don't allow it to achieve economies of scale. Consequently, the average
cost of Turkish Ucensed production would be higher than the average cost of any other
acquisition strategy. In Figure 4.1 theoretically, Turkish licensed production would be
probably somewhere between and Q^. This means that the average cost of licensed
production would be higher than the optimum average cost (Q ). In reality, scale
curves are L-shaped curves, (See Figure 4.2) sloping downwards at first and then
tending to become horizontal. The point at which the curve becomes horizontal
defmes the minimum optimum or efTicient scale (MES). Beyond MES there are
relatively few further cost savings. For example, in Figure 4.2 output Q^ approximates
the Turkish domestic requirements with an average cost level of C^ ; while output Q2
shows a coproduction output (which includes units for other countries) with an average
cost of C->. In this case, licensed production has higher average cost than average cost
of coproduction.
b. Military Technology and National Economy Trade-offs
(See p. 66).
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c. High Initial Investment
(See p. 66).
4. Advantages of Directed Licensing
a. Competition
The most important advantage of directed licensing is to provide domestic
competition between sources. The benefits of production competition would be a
reduction in unit procurement costs, leading to overall program savings, increased
equipment quality and industrial productivity. Competition may provide an incentive
for contractors to improve the quality and performance levels of their systems.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that in a competitive environment contractors are
more likely to propose cost-reducing, rather than cost-increasing design changes. Thus,
control of cost growth also has been identified as a potential benefit of competition
[Ref 73].
Competition during procurement is a new phenomena for Turkey. The
main reasons for this may be past governmental restrictions on the private sector in
production of military equipment, limited public sector's industrial capability (generally
one state-owned firm for production of each kind of equipment) and lack of experience.
b. Industrial Base
An enhanced industrial base is another potential benefit of competition.
Establishing two prime contractors may provide increased surge and mobilization
capacity, while lessening the potential for program delays. It also provides a second
source in case of losing one of the production sources. It is also argued that
competitive production contractors may improve their productivity and have an
advantageous competitive position for further contracts-government and commercial,
foreign and domestic [Ref 67: p. 1-16].
c. Little DIDA Involvement
The directed Ucense approach enables domestic technology transfer to be
achieved with little DIDA involvement. Thus, the administrative burden associated
with directed licensing will be lower than other acquisition techniques [Ref 67: p. 2-14].
DIDA can establish a second source without buying a complete data package.
5. Disadvantages of Directed Licensing
a. Increased Costs
Having competitive sources is not without cost. The acquisition authority
(DIDA) should recognize that production competition also involves additional costs.
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The most recognizable cost to DIDA is tiie increased initial funding necessary for
solicitation of a second source, technology transfer, procurement of toohng and test
equipment, and quahfication testing. Furthermore, the competitive split buy may lead
to excess capacity [Ref 67: p. 1-18]. Without export capabilities, this excess capacity
may cause high unit costs. Turkish Armed Forces' orders can not use two production
sources on an efficient scale. In addition, the use of royalty fees increases the cost of
second source's end items and may preclude the second source from attaining
competitive prices [Ref. 67: p. 2-15].
b. Slow and Limited Technology Transfer
The system developer holds the right to control the technical data. This
may complicate selection of the licensee, since the full data package can not be
released. Furthermore, there may be restrictions to other projects. Thus, under a
licensing technique, technical transfusion is slower than under other techniques where
the government procures unlimited data rights [Ref 67: p. 2-15].
c. Quality Variations
Because of different sources, there are variations in the quality between
competitive products.
d. Time Delay of Fielding
The licensor will spend time educating the second source. This can delay
fielding the systems.
e. Developer Reluctance
If there are significant alternative uses for the system, the original producer
will probably create barriers to second sourcing to maintain their competitive
advantage in those other markets. Sometimes it may be difficult to achieve the
necessary degree of cooperation between alternative production sources, and the
licensee may have Uttle recourse against half-hearted cooperation on the part of the
licensor. Contractors sometimes may bid on projects simply to obtain proprietary
information on other producers' design. [Ref 66: pp. 14,15]
/. Learning Curve and Economies of Scale
Dividing the production quantities among two or more sources reduces the
beneficial eflects of the learning curve and eliminates some economies of scale.
However, if effective price competition is established, the result will be a downward
shift and/or an increase in the slope of the learning curve. [Ref 66: pp. 14,15]
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E. 'LIFE OF TYPE' BUY (BUY-OUT)
1. Definition
This strategy is the one-time purchase of enough items to completely support
the system for tlie remainder of the system Ufe. Frequently referred to as a "life-of-type
buy" or simply "buyout" it generally results in buying a sufficient quantity to meet all
anticipated production requirements. This type of acquisition is generally used when
faced with losing manufacturing sources. [Ref. 74]
The definition from DOD instruction 4115.40 states that a life-of-type buy is
the one-time purchase of enough items to completely support the weapon system for
the remaining life of the system. It is more commonly referred to as a "buyout"
[Ref 75].
For the purpose of this thesis, buyout is defined as the one-time purchase of
enough components for the systems to prevent them from being unsupportable. A
system may become unsupportable due to the loss of sources of supply. The life-of-
type buy includes:
• A one time buy of enough components to completely support the system for
the remainder of the system's life,
• A one time buy of enough items until the system is redesigned,
• Procurement of enough semi-finished product (components) with the intention
of contracting for final assembly as needed. [Ref 74: p. 6]
In the United States, when a weapon system or end item of equipment reaches
the end of its usefulness, it is declared obsolete, and over a period of time, removed
from the inventories. As that system or equipment disappears, its unique spare parts
and various kinds of support material disappear also. However, foreign governments
which have previously purchased the item may not be prepared to either replace it or
have the item lose its usefulness due to a lack of spare parts. The resolution of this
conflict lies in the execution of a System Support Buy Out (SSBO). [Ref. 38: pp. 13-1 -
13-5]
SSBO consists, essentially, of notifying customers who iiave previously bought
a system or equipment that the item and its unique support are going to be dropped
from the U.S. inventory systems and that, if the customer wants to participate, he has
an opportunity to have final procurement of spare parts in sufficient range and depth
to support the customer's system or equipment for its projected remaining useful life
and "Buy Out" the remaining on hand stocks of repair and spare parts which are
unique to the system or equipment.
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Once the notification is made, if the customer elects to participate in the
SSBO. he does so by means of an already existing FMS case and normal FMS
procedures. Therefore, SSBO helps the customer to be able to maintain some degree ol"
support mto the future, while "clearing the shelves" of the U.S.. [Ref 3S: pp. 13-1 -
13-4]
This acquisition strategy is very much related to the short term solution of the
Turkish Armed Forces' current military equipment obsolescence. The previously
discussed three acquisition strategies (coproduction, TDP, licensing) offer long term
solutions to the problem. However, life of type buy is not only limited to solutions of
the current military equipment obsolescence. In contrast, a loss of production problem
might be the case in the future. Production sources (contractors and subcontractors)
might discontinue production. They may notify the government that they will no
longer be a source of supply for such reasons as, obsolete technology, financial
problems, uneconomical production rates, change in business mix, change in profit,
growth and investment opportunities etc.. Regardless of the reasons, the government
should consider the possibility of losing production sources. In addition, the
government should consider this method as an alternative strategy for its production
facilities. Domestic miUtary equipment factories involve various degrees of assembling
activities. Some components of the system come from foreign sources. Life of type
buy might be considered a proper strategy to have economies of scale and continuation
of production in production facilities. This section will discuss resolving the current
Turkish military equipment obsolescence problem with life of type buy.
2. Advantages of Life of Type buy
a. Elimination of Reliance on Production Sources
The most important advantage of the life of type buy is to provide
components always ready to use. For domestic assembly and production activities, it
provides sufficient items to avoid production shutdown. This eliminates reliance on
foreign (or domestic) production sources [Ref 74: pp. 19-32]. The program manager
may have the responsibihty of having the required components all available at the time
of need to sustain local assembly or production. From the program manager's point of
view life of type buy will solve the continuation of production problem.
b. Low Life Cycle Procurement Cost
One of the urgent needs of the Turkish Armed Forces is secondary item
requirements of its aging equipment. Some of these spare parts are not in production
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today which requires the start up of a production line to produce the items. These
start up costs can be high. B\ using life of type buy, Turkey can utiUze the economies
of scale of buying spares in high order quantities during initial or existmg production.
This results in lower spare part costs.
c. Continuation of the Same Configuration
Life of type buy provides capabiUty of continuing the same configuration
[Ref 76: pp. 59-62].
3. Disadvantages of Life of Type Buy
a. Difficulty of Estimating the Quantity to Purchase
The Ufe of type buy is generally pursued when other more economical
alternatives to a material shortage or manufacturing phase-out have been completely
explored. Quantities to purchase are dilTicult to estimate for such reasons as the lack
of comprehensive end item application data and the difficulty in predicting equipment
life [Ref 74: p. 19]. The quantity to be purchased depends on the equipment's life or
reproduction time. The first difficulty is in the prediction of this time period. This is
hardly possible for Turkish military equipment. Most of the equipment needs to be
replaced or at least modernized. However, limited budget and slow improving domestic
production capabilities make difficult to predict remaining utilization time of the
equipment. This may be coordinated with the long-term military acquisition plan,
para The second difficulty is in predicting the quantity of necessary components for the
predicted remaining Ufe of the equipment. One should determine the demand for each
kind of component. That can be calculated from mean time between failure (MTBF)
or failure rate of each component. According to the typical failure curve (bath-tub
phenomena) there is an increasing failure rate during the "wearout" phase of
equipment^ which is mostly the case for Turkish military equipment. Consequently,
that requires highly complicated and less reliable quantity prediction. This calculation
will resuk in considerable amount of component needs for remaining utilization time of
the equipment. If the system is considerably complex, estimation of the number of
components will be more difficult and less reliable.
b. Storage Difficulties
Life of type buy or buyout generally requires highly sensitive components
to be bought and stored. This generates storage problems because components may be
stored for several years before using them. The inventory will be subject to the
n
For more detailed information, see Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering
and Management, Prentice-Hall, 198L
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problems of deterioration and damage. Special problems, such as controlled
environment for tlie storage of microcircuits, may be encountered [Ref 74: pp. 18-20].
The inventoH/' also requires quite large and suitable storage buildings. Proper storage
conditions are necessary for good care of the components. They might also be subject
to physical damage from fire, sabotage etc. which may result in losing components.
c. Increased Storage Costs
Because life of type buy requires the purchase of a considerable amount of
components, it is necessary to have a controlled environment for the storage to keep
items usable. That results in increased storage costs and consequent high maintenance
costs.
d. Immediate Needs of Foreign Currency {High Short Term Cost)
Supply sources of Turkish military equipment are mostly foreign. At the
time of buy, the Turkish government would need a considerable amount of foreign
currency or it must search for credit possibilities. Having current foreign currency
difficulties or high foreign debt might make life of type buy infeasible for Turkey.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The researcher, drawing on the literature and his analysis, culminates this thesis
with several conclusions and recommendations.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. As discussed in Chapter II, the Turkish Armed Forces face a military
equipment obsolescence problem today. Four alternative acquisition policies
were ofTered to solve this problem. In Chapter III, the Turkish military base
was discussed and the advantages and disadvantages of the four acquisition
policies were covered in Chapter IV. However, these solutions should be
considered and compared to each other una>.r some special circumstances. The
following are components of the actual environment of the problem:
a. Threat: Because of Turkey's geo-strategic position and its missions in
NATO, Turkey faces a significant threat. In the early stages of a war, it
would have to fight alone and could not count on early reinforcements.
Therefore, its ability to resist intimidation must be grounded in internal
resources.
b. Economic Conditions: The Turkish economy is in a transition to
industrialization. It is obvious that the degree to which a country is
industrialized strongly affects its ability to undertake an arms production
program. The civilian industry' can, in certain areas, be rapidly adapted to
defense production. This area of overlap, called dual-use technology, seems
to be one of the easiest paths to a domestic arms production program for
Turkey. There is a highly sophisticated automotive industry in Turkey.
Automotive production lines could be readily adapted to produce armored
personnel carriers, military trucks and tanks. For example, Brazil has
restructured its Volkswagen assembly lines to produce tanks. Electrical
equipment industries can manufacture aeronautical and naval electrical
systems and hydraulic mechanisms for gun systems. Household appliance,
food processing and textile industries, which are the most sophisticated
Turkish industries, are readily adaptable for making military' logistical
equipment. However, the economy is experiencing unemployment and
inflation and labor rates are very low relative to Western countries. There
is a trade deficit and foreign currency difficulties.
c. Political Conditions: There is a nationwide support for domestic arms
production. The Turkish Government is quite eager to establish a domestic
defense industry. Domestic arms production is considered an alternative
policy to lessen the unemployment rate and the trade deficit. The
Government has set up a Defense Industry Development Fund and
Administration to establish, manage and control the defense industr>'
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through acquisition strategies. DIDA has some four billion dollars a year
to spend on arms without any approval of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. Acquisitions are not limited with an annual budget. Vlulti-year
funding is possible. There is a highly cflective two-step decision mechanism
to start a new program and strong incentives and tax exemptions are being
offered to attract foreign capital and technology.
Turkey is at a go/no-go point for most of its military equipment acquisition.
Acquisition strategies must be examined carefully to make the best decisions.
Each acquisition alternative must be examined on a number of aspects such as,
life cycle cost, system performance, delivery schedule, national economy
benefits, contribution to national and NATO defense capabilities, appHcability
of the approach in Turkish industry, international market considerations etc..
Each acquisition strategy must be examined on all of these aspects as well as
procurement cost and performance and capability of a system. Decision
variables affecting selection of an acquisition model and their comparisons are
as ibllows:
a. Life Cycle Cost: Total system cost includes all future costs associated with
the acquisition, utilization and subsequent disposition of the
system/ equipment. If one assumed zero disposition of the system cost,
total cost consists of R & D costs, investment costs (initial investment +
procurement cost) and operation and maintenance costs.
(1) R&D Cost: R&D cost includes all costs associated with
conceptual feasibiUty studies, basic research, advanced research and
development, engineering design, fabrication and test of engineering
prototype models (hardware), and associated documentation. It also
covers all related program management functions. Coproduction
seemingly occupies the most advantageous position of the strategies
because of participation of at least two nations and these costs would
be shared. In the TDP and licensing methods, R&D cost would be
included in the cost of the arrangement for the TDP or Ucensing
agreement. This cost would therefore be borne in part by Turkey.
The degree to which Turkey must pay this cost would be dependent
upon the specific purchase.
(2) Investment and Tooling Costs: Investment and tooling costs include
all costs associated with the acquisition of systems and equipment.
Specifically, this covers initial investments, manufacturing,
manufacturing management, system construction and initial logistic
support. Life of type buy has no investment cost. However,
depending on the item, it generally requires a controlled environment
for storage and maintenance of items. All other strategies require
high initial investment costs for production. However, in the
coproduction method initial investment costs are shared by at least
two nations while it is completely paid for by Turkey in the TDP and
the Ucensing strategies. Another investment cost is the
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manufacturing cost of a system (unit costs uill be compared for
conveniance). Life of type buy offers the least cost, because
procurement is made from "olf-the-shelf. Coproduction offers tlie
second least cost among the four alternatives mainly because foreign
orders can be shared with coproduction and there is a limited export
capacity, therefore production quantity is higher than from licensing
and TDP production. With licensed production, manufacturing cost
would be highest. As for the TDP, its manufacturing cost and unit
cost of each item depend on the purchased quantity and export
quantity (if applicable). {Manufacturing cost with TDP may vary.
With TDP, Turkey could have the unlimited rights to export the
system. In tliis case, the manufacturing and investment cost burden
to Turkey will be diminished.
(3) Operations and Maintenance Costs: Operations and maintenance cost
includes all costs associated with the operation and maintenance
support ol the system throughout its life cycle subsequent to
equipment dehvery in the field. Specific categories cover the cost of
system operation, maintenance, sustaining logistics support and
equipment modifications. The four alternative strategies all provide
continuous operational and maintenance support. However,
operational and maintenance costs depend mostly on type and
quantity of item to be produced.
Deliver}' Schedule: Life of type buy provides instant delivery because of
buying from directly "off-the-shelf. TDP and hcensed production provide
better delivery schedule than coproduction principally because of program
management difficulties and conflicting priorities among participant
nations.
National Economy Benefits:
(1) Job Opportunities: Coproduction provides the highest amount of job
opportunities for the national economy of the four alternatives.
However, job opportunities provided by coproduction will depend on
what percentage of the overall system is produced in Turkey. TDP
and licensed production would provide a considerable amount of job
opportunities for Turkey's economy while Ufe of type buy offers very
little.
(2) Technology Transfer: TDP has an important advantage with regard
to this variable since TDP offers unlimited technology transfer to
Turkey. It is followed by coproduction and licensing. Buyout
provides very httle opportunities in transferring technology.
However, in the coproduction and the licensing technique, technology
transfer takes place face-to-face with the original developer. There is
a high risk involved in the TDP technique. It is extremely difficult to
produce complex systems under TDP. Therefore coproduction and
licensing are the most promising in technology transfer criteria.
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(3) Balance of Payments'. The coproduction and TDP strategies will
contribute to the balance of payments through import savings and
export earnings. Licensing is expected to provide import savings.
However, to date, historical records show that arms production in
some countries has resulted in decreasing import-substitution. The
SIPRI figures show that it is not the countries with the highest
production values that have become least dependent on arms imports.
The import values are still much higher than the production values in
India and Israel. In India, substitution is even decreasing. The
highest production-to-import ratios are found in Brazil (also reflecting
substantial arms exports), Nort Korea and South Africa [Ref 77].
(4) Offset Opportunities: Coproduction offers the highest degree of offset
benefits. It is followed by licensed production. TDP and life of type
buy do not normally provide offset benefits to Turkey.
(5) Other Domestic Industry Effects: Investments in the defense industrv'
may cause Turkey to experience a higher inflation rate than it has
now. However, defense spending may increase capacity utilization,
expand output, raise the rate of return on capital and may increase
the gross national product (GNP) of Turkey. On the other hand,
increased domestic military investments may reduce the civilian
domestic product. These effects are difficult to predict.
d. Contribution to National Defense: Arms production through these
acquisition strategies should bring new defense capabilities to Turkey. So,
technology of the arms to be produced should add to the current military
capabiUty. In addition, they should meet a real Turkish military need and
not just be prestige weapons to produce.
e. Contribution to NATO: Technology transfer and the production of the
same kind of weapons in NATO will contribute to NATO's RSI policy and
its military capability while providing lower unit costs to its nations.
f International Market Considerations: TDP provides Turkey unlimited rights
to export arms while coproduction has some market limitations. Licensing
and life of type buy do not provide the right to Turkey to export.
g. Program Management: Program management is highly complex and
difficult in coproduction programs. It is relatively easy to manage the
licensing and TDP programs. Second sourcing methods could be used for
competitive procurement. However, Turkish orders are too low to
implement second sourcing methodology effectively. It is especially true for
TDP. Qualifying a second source takes time. Split of production
quantities through second sourcing will increase costs and decrease learning
curve opportunities. The more complex the system the more difficult it is




As a summan' of this research, the following recommendations are made:
1. Coproduction seems to be the most promising acquisition strategy and should
be used under tiiese following conditions:
a. If a system to be produced is highly complex,
b. If a system requires advanced technology (higher than Turkish industry
capabilities),
c. If a system might involve complex and costly R&D activities.
2. TDP seems to be the most promising acquisition strategy and should be used
under these following conditions:
a. If it is implemented after production of the system in Turkey under license.
There are some weapons which are already in production under license in
Turkey. Buying TDP of these systems is a good place to start.
b. The production of relatively simple systems or components. TDP can also
be proper for supporting coproduction or licensed production. Some
components which are required in the production of systems under
coproduction or license, can be produced with TDP.
c. For production of spare parts.
3. Licensing does not offer very much of a future because of its low production
runs and high unit costs. However, it is good for transfering technology and
production experiences. It can be used as a first step strategy before buying the
TDP, or realizing coproduction or domestic design production. It is also proper
for creating second source and competitive procurement.
4. Life of type buy is the best way to support systems which are now being used in
the Turkish Armed Forces. This strategy should be used:
a. To support current systems until domestic production replaces these
systems,
b. To support domestic production in case of losing a foreign source or
subcontractor which provides some parts to the domestic source,
c. In the future
,
to provide support for future systems in case of losing
related domestic production sources.
5. Turkey should behave as competitive buyer and shop around to get the best
price and quality combinations for a specific system solution to a military
mission need.
6. In order to take advantage of economies of scale in production, Turkey should
look to produce more than just their own requirement, regardless of whether
coproduction or TDP strategy is used. This could also be termed using an
"export-oriented" pohcy vice an "import substitution" policy.
7. To become an arms producer very quickly, Turkey should utilize the
technologies that are adaptable to its current and developing industrial system.
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8. In an attempt to summarize and quantify the above recommendations, the
author offers a rating matrix as Table 2. In Table 2, tiie first column shows the
criterion discussed above to rate the alternative acquisition strategies. Columns
two through five show the alternative policies and their values resulting from
this study. A maximum value (5) for a criterion indicates the optimum or most
desirable situation for Turkey while a value of zero indicates the least or
minimum. A further refinement of this technique is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 adds a column entitled "weight" which allows for a distribution of
preference among the criterion. This allows the user the interject their belief as
to which criterion are the most important. The values in Table 3 reflect the
opinion of the author.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
It is obvious that the outcome of using the matrix in Table 3 strongly depends on
the relative value of the weights assigned. Therefore, the specific values of the weights
must be determined. This determination offers an area of further research to quantify
the specific objectives of the Turkish government.
In choosing between alternative acquisition strategies, or selecting a mix, the
DIDA would have to know the total costs of each proposed system and their effects on
its policy objectives. This information would be determined according to the proposals
of the bidders. To use or test the matrix specific real costs of each system and their
specific advantages and disadvantages with regard to the alternative acquisition
strategies would have to be used.
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TABLE 2
SIMPLE RATING MATRIX FOR EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE
ACQUISITION STRATEGIES




























































MARKET CONS. 4 5
PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT 3 5 4




SELECTING MOST PROMISING ACQUISITION STRATEGY
Criterion Weieht Coproduction T D P Licensing Buyout









\. R&D Cost 0.07 {4)-0.2S {2)-0.I4 {3)-0.21 (5)-0.35
2. Investment &
ToolmgCost 0.15 (5)-0.75 (3)-0.45 (3)-0.45 (5)-0.75
3. Operation &









Transfer 0.08 (5)-0.40 {4)-0.32 (3)-0.24 {0)-0
2. Balance of
Pavments 0.07 (4)-0.2S (3)-0.21 (3>0.21 {0)-0
3. OiTset 0.10 5-0.50 (3)-0.30 (0) -0 0-0








MARKET CONS. 0.09 (4)-0.36 {5)-0.45 (0)-0 (0)-0
PROGR.AM
MANAGEMENT 0.05 (3)-0.15 (5)-0.25 (4)-0.20 (0)-0
WEIGHTED TOTAL 1.0 4.34 3.92 3.11 2.3
(R): Relative ranking from Table 2.








ACDA: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AECA: Arms Export Control Act
AM: Acquisition Manager
ASN: Assistant Secretary of the Navy (U.S.)
ATMG: Arms Transfer Management Group
AWACS: Airborne Warning Control System
BWB: Federal Procurement Office (FR Germany)
CAO: Case Administering Office
CAT: Conventional Arms Transfer
CLO: Country Liason Officer (Foreign Country Representative)
CLSSA: Cooperative Logistics Supply Arrangements
CNO: Chief of Naval Operations
CPAF: Cost Plus Avard Fee
CPD: Congressional Presentation Document
CPFF: Cost Plus Fixed Fee
CPIF: Cost Plus Incentive Fee
CPL: Country Program Listing
DAR: Defense Acquisition Regulation
DCAS: Defense Contract Administration Services
DD: Department of Defense (used with form numbers)
DIDA: Defense Industry Support and Development Administration
DIES: Defense Integrated Financial System
DISAM: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DOD: Department of Defense
DSAA: Defense Security Assistance Agency
EDA: Excess Defense Articles
EPG: European Producing Group
ESF: Economic Support Fund
FAA: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation
FOR: Foreign Country Representative
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FFP: Firm Fixed Price
FLO: Foreign Liaison Ofilcer
FiMS: Foreign Militar\' Sales
FOB: Free on Board
FPIF: Fixed Price Incentive Fee
FY: Fiscal Year
FYDP: Five Year Defense Program
FYPSG: Five Year Plan for Strategic Goals
GA: Grant Aid
GAO: General Accounting Office
GBL: Government Bill ot' Lading
ILC: International Logistics Center
IMET: International Military Education and Training
ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations
JCS: Joint Chief of Staff
KAF: Kayseri Aircraft Factory
LCC: Life Cycle Cost
LOA: Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DD Form 1513)
LOI: Letter of Intent
LOR: Letter of Request
MAG: Military Assistance Group
MAAG: Military Assistance and Advisory Group
MAP: Military Assistance Program
MASM: Military Assistance and Sales Manual
MET: Main Battle Tank
MISIL: Management Information System, International Logistics
MKEK: Machinery and Chemistry Industry Corporation
MND: Ministry of National Defense (Turkey)
MOA: Memoranda of Agreement
MOU: Memoranda of Understanding
MTTR: Mean Time to Repair
MTU: Motoren and Turbinen Union Corporation (FR Germany)
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVILCO: Navy International Logistics Control Center
OA: Obligational Authority
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0MB: OfTice of Management and Budget
OP-63: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Security Assistance Division
OPNAV: Ofilce of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSD: Onice of the Secretary' of Defense
P&A: Price and Availability
P&R: Planning and Review
PKO: Peacekeeping Operations
POM: Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS: Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PTT: Turkish Mail Telephone Telegram Inc.
QA: Quality Assurance
R&D: Research and Development
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RFP: Request for Proposal
SA: Security Assistance
SAAC: Security Assistance Accounting Office
SAO: Security Assistance Organization
SDAF: Special Defense Acquisition Fund
SECDEF: Secretary of Defense
SECNAV: Secretary of Navy
SCE: Significant Combat Equipment
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
STANAG: Standardization Agreement (NATO)
SYCOM: System Command
TAI: Turkish Aerospace Industry Inc.
TEI: Tusas Engine Industries Inc.
TDP: Technical Data Package
TGS: Turkish General Staff
THK: Turkish Air League Administration
UN: United Nations
USAF: United States Air Force
USG: United States Goverment
USMC: United States Marine Corps
USN: United States Na\7
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS
Acceptance, Letter of Offer: (U.S. DD Form 1513 OfTer and Acceptance) by which the
U.S. Government oilers to sell to a foreign government or international organization
defense articles and defense services pursuant to the arms Export Control Act, as
amended. The DD Form 1513 lists the items and,or services, estimated costs, the
terms and conditions of sale, and provides for the foreign governments signature to
indicate acceptance.
Arms Transfers: Defense articles and defense services such as arms, ammunition, and
implements of war, including components thereof, and the training, manufacturing
licenses, technical assistance and technical data related thereto, provided by the
government under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Blanket Order EMS Case: An agreement between foreign customer and the U.S.
Government for a specific category items or services (including training) with no
defmitive listing of items or quantities. The case specifies a dollar ceiling against which
orders may be placed throughout the ordering period, normally 12 months.
Case: A contractual sales agreement between the U.S. and an eligible foreign country
or international organization documented by DD Form 1513. A FMS case identifier is
assigned for the purpose of identification, accounting, and data processing for each
offer (DD Form 1513).
Cash Sales (DoD): Either cash with Acceptance payment within a reasonable period
not to exceed 120 days after delivery of the service, or payments of funds required to
suppliers under a "Dependable Undertaking."
Co-Development: A development project to which to which more than one government
contributes efforts or resources.
Commercial Sale: Sale made by U.S. industry directly to a foreign buyer which is not
administered by the DoD through FMS procedures.
Coproduction (international): Method by which items intended for military application
are produced and; or assembled under a cooperative agreement that requires the
transfer of technical information and know-how from one nation to another.
Country Team: Senior members of U.S. Government agencies assigned to a U.S.
diplomatic mission overseas, and subject to the direction and supervision of the chief,
U.S. Mission (Ambassador). Normally, such members meet regularly to coordinate
U.S. Government political, economic and military activities and policies in the host
countr\'.
Credit: Transactions approved on a case-by-case basis by the Department of State,
Treasury and Defense, which allow repayment of military export sales for periods
beyond 120 days after delivery of material or performance of service. (Sections 23 and
24, AECA).
Defined Order Case: These cases are characterized by separately identified line items
on the DD Form 1513.
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DoD Direct Credit: Long-term credit which is directly financed from the appropriation
or account available for that purpose. Authority is Section 23 o[ the Arms Export
Control Act,
Eligible Recipient (FMS): Any friendly foreign country or international organization
determined by the President to be eligible to purchase defense articles and defense
services, (section 3, AECA)
Excess Defense Articles: U.S. Defense articles which are in excess of the Approved
Force Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock of all Department of
Defense Components, they are dropped from the inventory by the supplying agency for
delivery to countries or international organizations. (Sec. 644(g), FAA)
Grant Aid (Military): Military Assistance rendered under the authority of the FAA for
which the U.S. receives no dollar reimbursement. Consists of MAP and IMETP.
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR): A document prepared by the Office
of Munitions Control, Department of State, providing licensing and regulatory
provisions for the export of defense articles, technical data and services. The ITAR
also provides the U.S. Munitions List. (Federal Register, Vol.45, No. 246)
Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA): U.S. Department of Defense (DD) Form 1513
Offer and Acceptance by which the U.S. Government offers to sell to a foreign
government or international organization defense articles and defense services pursuant
to the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. The DD Form 1513 lists the items
and/or services, estimated costs, the terms and conditions of sale, and provides for the
foreign government's signature to indicate acceptance.
Letter of Request (LOR): Term to identify a request from eligible FMS participants for
the purchase of defense articles and services. The request may be in message or letter
format.
Major Defense Equipment: Any item of significant combat equipment on the U.S.
Munitions List having a non-recurring research and development cost of more than
S50 million or a total production cost of more than S200 million.
Military Assistance Program (MAP): That portion of the United States security
assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which
provides defense articles and services to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis.
Military Export Sales: All sales of defense articles and defense services made from U.S.
sources to foreign governments, foreign private firms and international organizations.
Such sales fall into two major categories: Foreign Military Sales and Commercial Sales.
Munitions List: The U.S. Munitions List lists defense articles and defense services in
the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR).
Operation & Maintenance Costs (O&M Costs): Costs associated with the equipment,
supplies, and services required to train, operate, and maintain forces, including cost of
spare parts other than concurrent spares and initial stockages, ammunition and missiles
used training or replacements for such items expended in training or operations, rebuild
and overhaul costs (excluding modernization) of equipment subsequent to initial issue,
training and other services that do not constitute investment costs, and administrative
costs associated with overall program management and administration.
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Planning, Programming, Budget System (PPBS): An integrated system for the
establishment, maintenance, and revision of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) and
DOD budget.
Reimbursements: Funds realized from the sale of MAP owned property, such funds
begin deposited to MAP accounts and available for Programming.
Trust Fund (FMS): A fund credited with receipts which are earmarked by law and held
in trust, or a fiduciary capacity by the government for use in carrying out specific
purposes and programs in accordance with an agreement.
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APPEiNDIX C
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS
Any assistance provided to a foreign country should support U.S. security
assistance objectives, which is stated in Chapter III. Law requires a presidential
determination first to cite the eligibility of any country to receive U.S. defense articles
and services. There must be continuous consultation between the U.S. Security
Assistance Organization (SAO) and the recipient country during planning of FMS
sales. [Ref 34: p. 8-1]
Even before a specific request is made by a purchasing country, the U.S. may be
involved in forward planning, to determine the needs of the buying country and tiie
budget and procurement issues relating to the U.S.. There are several separate
planning activities. The actual planning of FMS sales, however is carried out by two
types of groups: the "Country Team"^ and the "Washington Team", which may be a
consultative or survey team dispatched for a particular purpose, or associated with a
Joint MiUtary Commission. A key planning instrument prepared by the country team,
is the Annual Integrated Assessment for Security Assistance (AIASA). Other planning
documents include Consolidated Data Reports (CDRs), which abbreviate the AIASA
information for use in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD). This is
produced as part of the budget process each year and outlines in general detail what
will be required for a given country in the form of security assistance. For some
countries, a Security Assistance Defense Analysis Paper may be prepared annually.
Any country desiring to buy or lease defense articles or defense services, whether
FMS or commercial sales, must first meet the eligibihty requirements under the U.S.
Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The recipient must also agree to provide the
security protection to the item purchased.
Although, an FMS sale may be for cash, it differs from a commercial sale in that
the Department of Defense buys the equipment and manages the entire sale. The sale
may be financed using FMS Credits under the U.S. international security assistance
program. FMS credits are made as part of the foreign assistance budget request.
The Country Team involves the Country Security Assistance Office (SAO) in
the affected country, regional departments of the State and Defense Departments, the
Operations branch of DSAA, and the Commanders of the Unified Commands of the
Armed Forces responsible for the area involved.
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Sometimes that request includes a statement that a given country is expected to use its
credits for a specific purchase or for a generic category* of equipment or it could remain
unspecified with tiie countr\' then requesting equipment,
FMS credit funds may be used for procurement outside of the U.S. only if the
President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the
U.S. economy or industrial mobilization base. Some FMS credits may be used to
finance commercial sales. These are handled like regular commercial sales except for
an additional referal of the sale to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA),
which manages FMS for the Pentagon. Another way of financing an FMS sale is
through the use of U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds. MAP, a part of
the international security assistance package, provides outright grants of equipment,
training, or funds. MAP funds are transferred to the countr>''s FMS account, so for all
practical purposes a MAP delivery operates exactly like an FMS sale.
Customer's requests can be originated either in the purchasing country or in the
U.S.. If they originated in the purchasing country they should be sent via the U.S.
Embassy. These requests can originate with the purchasing country's representative in
Washington. First, the type of request is determined. There are two types of request:
request for significant military equipment (SME) and requests for all other foreign
military' sales. The FMS process for these two kinds of requests are different. (See
Figures C.l and C.2). There are several ways to request Foreign Militar\' Sales. The
precise channels through which it proceeds may be depend on the country of origin,
the type of request, the service involved and other considerations. If the foreign
countr>' seeks Significant MiUtary Equipment (SME refers the U.S. Munitions List
which is published as part of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations), the
request must be sent to the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Politico- Military
Affairs ("State PM") and also to the DSAA, the Pentagon's main implementation body
for all foreign security assistance. For SME, the request must address need, force
structure effects, the reaction of neighboring countries, the ability to operate and
support the equipment, the source of financing, "human rights considerations", and
whether the U.S. Government should approve transfer.
For Foreign Military Sales on the Munitions List, but not identified as
Significant Military' Equipment, the channels differ. If the request originates abroad, it
may be transmitted to the Embassy, or "the DoD element of the U.S. country team"
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or service. For the U.S. military services, the "Cognizant Military' Departments"
(MILDEPs) are:
1. ARMY: U.S. Army Security Assistance Center, Washington. D.C..
2. NAVY: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-63),
3. AIR FORCE: USAF Air Staff (PAI) and Air Force Logistics Command
International Logistics Center,
4. Defense Contract Audit Agency,
5. Defense iMapping Agency,
6. Defense Logistics Agency,
The State PM is the responsible authority. It would normally send the request
out for comment to the regional bureaus. If the request is small, the PM and DSAA
will process it and perhaps include the regional bureaus and the relevant countr}' desks
within the State Department. If all is routine, the PM will notify DSAA for approval.
For an expensive system, which requires Congressional approval, the PM must prepare
Congressional notification. After the Under Secretary approves the request, DSAA is
notified.
DSAA coordinates the Pentagon's side, including the relevant country desks and
other interested agencies. For a simple request, or from a countrv' with a long-
established military relationship with the U.S., the process is routine. In complicated
cases, an iterative effort between the various divisions of State and DoD ensures; it is a
"non-linear" process which involves much coordination and does not lend itself to
graphic representation.
The general procedures of a Letter of Request (LOR) are explained below. In
Figures C.3 through C.7, LOR processing is shown in detail.
After an initial request is received, there are several possible approaches. The
buyer may request either preliminary informational data known as Planning and
Review (P&R) data, or more specific and detailed Price and Availability (P&A) data
which offers precise estimates of the costs involved and speed of delivery available, or
may directly request the preparation of a Letter of Offier and Acceptance (LOA).
The usual document used for the actual sale transaction is DoD Form 1513 (DD
Form 1513), which lists the items or services, estimated costs, terms and conditions of
the sale. There may also be a Letter of Intent (LOI), for cases where procurement of
long lead time items may need to be financed; and either DD Form 212, which










































Figure C.4 Case Acceptance and Implementation [Ref. 38: p. 1-13].
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Figure C.6 Case Execution (Cont'd).
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Figure C7 Case Closure [Ref. 38: p. 1-16].
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issuance, or Form 2012-1, which covers the period between LOA issuance and
acceptance. The LOA itself, which details what is being ordered, can range fi-om a
couple of pages for a simple order to 30 or more pages for a complex package. It is
written by the implementing service. In the Army, for example, this is the Material
Readyness Command; in the Navy, the Security Assistance Division (OP-63) of^ the
Office of the CNO, and in the Air Force, the Air Staff Directorate of International
Programs (AF/PAI).
Once completed, the LOA still requires a review process by various agencies. If
the foreign buyer fmds the offer acceptable (and this is usually the case because of the
degree of coordination put into the case beforehand, but there have been instances
where an LOA was issued but financial or other terms were subsequently rejected) then
the purchaser must complete and sign the DD 1513's acceptance portion, date it. and
fonA'ard the copies to the military department (MILDEP), as well as an additional copy
to the Security Assistance Accounting Administration (SAAC) in Denver. SAAC is a
branch of DSAA, but runs independently as the accounting manager for FMS. Any
required initial deposit (specified in the DD 1513) must be provided in U.S. dollars by
check, or wire transfer before the expiration date. If the purchaser wishes to extend the
expiration dates, a full review is required by the preparing agency to insure that all
price and other data remains valid. If change of expiration date is authorized, then
SAAC and the DSAA are provided a copy of the message.
Once the LOA is signed and sealed, only delivery remains. SAAC issues the
obligational authority (OA) to the cognizant DoD component, as evidence that proper
acceptance of the LOA has been received. Procurement and logistical aspects of
delivery will not be described in excessive detail here. Procurement procedures depend
on the item, but are handled in the same way as regular U.S. Government
procurement, with program directors and system managers as needed, dealing with the
U.S. Military Assistance and Advisor}' Group (MAAG) in the buying country and
overseeing progress of the deal. The basic procurement varies according to the case.
Items may be procured from new production or taken from U.S. Government stocks,
and the complete system then put together or FMS needs may be consolidated with
U.S. Government procurement requirements or placed on a separate contract,
whichever is more efficient.
In 1981, legislation authorized the creation of the Special Defense Acquisition
Fund (SDAF) as a revolving fund separate from other accounts, under DoD control.
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to finance the acquisition of defense articles in anticipation of their sale through FMS.
This was done to make it possible to fill urgent ree|uirements more quickly, smooth out
production rates, and reduce procurement time. The SDAF is under the direction of
the Director of the Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). Usually SDAF items are
actually sold prior to the actual delivery from production. When all items are finally




^This section is obtained from [Refs. 78,34: pp. 7-14,8.1-8.13].
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APPENDIX D
LAW CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF DiDA
LAW CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION AND AMENDMENTS IN
TWO ARTICLES OF THE LAW REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
NATIONAL LOTTERY NO. 3670 OF 11 JULY 1939, AND ONE ARTICLE OF THE
LAW REGARDING VALUE ADDED TAX, NO. 3065 OF 25 OCTOBER 1984 (LAW
NO. 3238, LEGISLATION DATE: 7 NOVEMBER 1985)
PURPOSE
Article 1. The purpose of this law is to develop a modern defense industry and provide
modernization for the Turkish Armed Forces.
DEFINITIONS
Article 2. Abbreviations:
Board: Defense Industr>' High Coordination Board.
Committee: Defense Industry Executive Committee.
Fund: Defense Industry Support Fund.
Administration: Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA).
DEFENSE INDUSTRY HIGH COORDINATION BOARD
Article 3. The Defense Industry High Coordination Board, under the Chairmanship of
the Prime Minister, is composed of the Cliief of General Staff, Minister of State for
Economic Affairs, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister
of Finance and Customs, Minister of Industry and Commerce, Service Commanders,
General Commander of the Gendarmerie, Undersecretary to the Prime Minister,
Undersecretary of the State Planning and Organization and Undersecretary of the
Treasury and Foreign Trade.
The board shall meet at least twice a year upon call by the Prime Minister.
FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD
Article 4. The functions of the Board are specified below:
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• Follow up the planning and coordination, in line with the general strategy
approved by the Council of Ministers (cabinet), and issue guiding directives.
« Establish the manner of procurement of weapon systems, material and
equipment envisioned for procurement through the Fund in conformity with the
Strategic Target Plan developed by the Turkish General Staff.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Article 5. Defense Industry Executive Committee, under the chairmanship of the Prime
Minister, is composed of the Chief of General Staff and Minister of National Defense.
The committee shall meet upon call by the Prime Minister. The President of
Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA) shall act as the
Secretary* of the Committee.
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
Article 6, The functions of the Committee are specified below:
• Make decisions in line with the general strategy and principles established for
developing the defense industry by the High Coordination Board.
• Make decisions relevant to local production or, when necessary, internal or
external procurement of modern weapons, material and equipment which are
required to be procured in accordance with the Strategic Target Plan for the
Turkish Armed Forces.
• Seek opportunities for the public and private sector to estabUsh defense
production faciUties, with foreign capital and technology; when necessar>\ make
decisions in principle for the State participation in such facilities.
• Issue instructions to DIDA concerning research, development, prototype
production, advance payments, long term orders and other financial and
economic incentives for modern weapons, material and equipment.
• Make decisions on exportation, offset and mutual trade of defense industry
products.
• Provide co-ordination between organizations concerned in defense industry.
• Establish guidelines for utilization of the Defense Industry Fund.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT
ADMINISTRATION (DIDA)
Article 7. DIDA is estabhshed as an organization attached to the Ministry of National
Defense and has legal personality.
The President of DIDA shall be appointed by a joint decree, the vice presidents
and department heads shall be appointed on proposals by the president and approval
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of the Ministry of National Defense; and other personnel shall be appointed by the
President of DIDA. The president may delegate this authority to his immediate
subordinate.
PERSONNEL REGIME
Article 8. (Not included)
BUDGET
Article 9. The budget of the Administration shall be made up of an amount which
does not exceed two percent of Defense Industry Support Fund. This amount may be
increased by a maximum of 50 percent by the Council of Ministers.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Article 10. The functions of the Administration are specified below:
• Implement the decisions made by the Executive Committee,
• Make contracts on orders for procurement programs,
• Re-organize and integrate the existing national industry according to defense
industry requirements, encourage new enterprises and guide them according to
the integration and requirements, seek possibilities for foreign capital and
technology contribution, guide the enterprises, and make plans for State
participation in this respect,
• Determine the procurement programs and funding models by considering the
funding sources,
• Plan for production of modern weapons, material and equipment,
• Support export oriented, private, public or mixed investments.provided,
• Research and develop modern weapons, material and equipment; produce their
prototypes; make advance payments; establish long term orders and other
financial and economic incentives,
• Make contracts including technical and financial matters by considering the
terms of purchases to be made according to peculiarity of the matter, and the
specifications and standards to be determined by the Ministry of National
Defense (MND).
• Coordinate the exploration of Defense industry products and offset trade
matters,
• Provide credit from the Fund or obtain credit from local and foreign sources
and, set up companies with local and foreign capital,
• Follow up as to whether or not the goods produced are in conformity with the
contract terms, and whether or not the quality controls and contract terms are
fulfilled.
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• Insure that implementation problems are resolved between the establishments
and organizations concerned.
NON APPLICABLE PROVISIONS AND PRIORITY
Article II. The provisions o[ General Accounting Law No. 1050, State Tender Law
No. 2S86, and Supreme Accounting Court Law No. 832 shall not be applied to the
activities and transactions envisioned in this law.
Preparation of the technical specifications and quality control services requested
by the Administration shall be accomplished on a priority basis by the MND and
Service Commands.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY SUPPORT FUND
Article 12. To realize the objective of this law, Defense Industr}' T vport Fund is
established at the disposal of the Administration at the Central Bank of Turkey. The
sources of the Fund are shown below:
• Yearly State Budget appropriations,
• Amounts to be determined-as much as 20 times, maximum- by the council of
Ministers in multiples of 50 lira per package, bottle or similar container in sales
of all types of alcoholic beverages (sparkling wine, Vermont and cinchona wine
included; other types of wines and beer excluded) and alcohol; as well as
multiples of 10 Lira per package, bottle or similar container in sales of
cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, rolling tobacco, snuff, leaf tobacco and similar
tobacco products, beer and other types of wine. However, the amount to be
paid to the Fund shall be taken into consideration as expense in computation of
the base for income and corporate tax. The Council of Ministers is authorized
to differentiate the amounts to be paid according to the size of containers of
products to be subjected to Fund payment, and the amounts to be received on
the basis of importation of merchandise groups; and estabUsh the size of
containers which will not be subjected to Fund payment, and the procedures
and guidelines for payments to be made to the Fund.
• Transfers to be made from the Foundations established for the purpose of
strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces,
• Revenues cited in Article 11 of the Law Regarding Establishment of the
National Lottery No. 3670,
• Entire share alloted in accordance with Law No. 1473 of 25 August 1971, and
the entire net proceeds obtained from all kinds of parimutuals-current or to be
established- or the amounts to be computed from these proceeds on a rate to be
determined by the Council of Ministers,
• Transfers to be made on amounts determined by the Council of Ministers from
funds established by law (tax laws excluded),
116
• Funds to be collected from oil consumption at a rate to be determined at
maximum live percent by the Council of Ministers, on the basis established for
fuel consumption tax,
• Funds to be allocated for modern weapons, material and equipment in the
budget of the MND.
• Amount to be allocated between Housing Development Fund and Defense
Industry Support Fund by the Council of Ministers from the collections at a
maximum rate of 50 percent of gross proceeds of fortune games operated under
permission in accordance with Article 19 of Law of Tourism Incentives No.
2634, dated 12.3.1982, (however, the amounts paid to the Fund through this
article shall be considered as an expense with regard to the taxable income).
• Revenue to be obtained from the assets owned by the Fund,
• Revenue to be obtained from the payable military service pursuant to Article 10
of the Military Service Law No. 1111,
• Donations and aids.
No share shaU be allotted, pursuant to Law No. 2380, to the municipalities and
local governments from the revenues collected and paid to Defense Industry Support
Fund by public organizations which are included in the General Budget. The Council
of Ministers is authorized to set rules and regulations for utilization of excess amounts
of the Fund in total or partially in short-term investments out of the Central Bank.
LIABILITY, DECLARATION, PLACE AND TIME OF PAYMENT
Article 13.
• The liable parties for the payments to the Fund on delivery of the products
listed at subpara. b of article 12 of this law are the local manufacturers or
importers who produce or import those products. Payments to be made in this
manner shall be declared in a Supplementary Tax Return Form arranged in
accordance with the provisions of the Value Added Tax Law No. 3065.
Exemptions indicated in the Value Added Tax No. 3065 shall be valid also for
implementation of this subpara.
• The share allocated through Law No. 1473 dated 8.25.1971, and the whole or
certain parts determined by the Council of Ministers of the share to be
allocated from existing or to be established parimutuals shall be charged by the
organizers of such games. The shares shall be declared along with Value Added
Tax returns of the month concerned to the tax office and paid within the same
period. The Ministry of Finance and Customs is authorized to set the rules and
regulations for the declaration of this amount.
• The share of the Petroleum Consumption Tax to be transfered to the Fund
which is determined by Council of Ministers and collected by the liable parties
of this tax, shall be declared to the tax office of their headquarters on a form to
be determined by the Ministry of Finance and Customs, by the twentieth
evening of the following month and shall be paid within the same period.
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• The amount to be collected in accordance with the decision of the Council of
Ministers at a rate maximum fifty percent of the gross proceeds of tlie fortune
games permitted under article 19 of the Law of Tourism Incentives No. 2634
dated 3. 12.1982, shall be declared by real or legal entities who operate those
establishments, along with their Value Added Tax returns to their tax oRices,
and shall be paid within the same periods. The Ministry of Finance and
Customs is authorized to determine the principles and regulations for the
declaration of this payment.
• Two and a half percent of the sum computed as Income and Corporate Tax
shall be separately calculated by taxpayers as an amount payable to Defense
Industry Support Fund. Liable persons who withhold taxes shall add to their
short return forms the amount they computed for the Fund and pay it to the
appropriate tax office along with their withholding taxes.
Income and corporate taxpayers who submit annual, short or specific returns
shall add the amount payable to the Fund into their return forms and pay it along with
their income and corporate taxes. In the events when any amount had been calculated
and paid previously for the Fund in the income declared in that return, this amount
shall be deducted from the sum calculated according to the return. Amount held
internally shall not be subject to this Fund. In computation of amounts to be paid to
the Fund by taxpayers whose incomes are computed in the lump sum method, the
income tax computed over the total amount indicated in their tax books shall be taken
as the basis.
In connection with the rules and guidelines on levying, assessment and payment
of the amount to be paid to the Fund by income and corporate taxpayers and liable
parties for withholding taxes, provisions of income and corporate tax laws shall apply.
The CouncU of Ministers is authorized to increase to 7.5 percent or decrease to
zero the 2.5 percent indicated in this article. This authorization may be used for
determining separate rates for each of the types of incomes subject to withholding.
Amount collected for the Fund by tax offices and accounting ofTices according to this
article shall be transfered to the Fund Account at the Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey by the end of their collection.
THE EXEMPTIONS
Article 14. Defense Industr>' Development and Support Administration and the Fund
under the authority of the Administration are exempt from:
• The Corporate Tax,
• Inheritance and Transfer Tax for grants and donations to be made,
• Stamp Tax for all transactions,
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• The Banking and Insurance Transactions Tax for interest of the loans lent.
The provisions of previously existing laws and regulations regarding exemptions
on taxes, dues and fees applicable for:
• The shares of the Foundations at various enterprises,
• General Directorate of Defense Ordnance Enterprises and its afiiliations shall
continue to apply after they are transferred to Defense Industry Development
and Support Administration and the Fund established at the order of this
Administration (excluding those to be established anew).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAWS NO. 213 AND 6183
Article 15. For the amounts to be charged on the taxpayers for the Fund, the Tax
Regulations Law and the Collection Procedures Law for Public Claims shall apply.
Article 16. The second paragraph of Article 60 of the Value Added Tax Law No ?065
is amended as follow:
The base of the Additional Tax shall consist of the factors that make the base of
the Value Added Tax. The amount to be paid to Defense Industry Support
Fund is not to be included in the base.
AUDITING
Article 17. All kinds of transactions of the Administration and the Fund shall be
audited by a board composed of one member from each of the Prime Ministry, the
Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Finance and Customs elected for two
years.
Article 18. Articles 1 and 11 of the Law Concerning Establishment of National Lottery
No. 3670 are amended as follows:
Article I. With the aim of assisting defense industry, a National Lottery
Administration is established as an organization which is attached to the Ministry of
Finance and Customs, has legal personahty, is subject to civil regulations and is
qualified for every kind of transactions. The right to draw lottery in cash within
Turkey belongs only to the National Lottery Administration.
Article 11. The net revenue of the past year to be transfered to the Treasury is to
be determined by the end of the second month of each fiscal year on the balance sheet
by subtracting current and investment expenditures from gross revenues, shall be
recorded by Ministry of Finance and Customs on the one hand as revenue for the State
Budget and on the other hand as appropriation for the relevant section of the Budget
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of the MND in fifteen days at the latest and shall be paid to the account of Defense
Industn' Support Fund ai the Central Bank in cash at once within a week.
STATE PROPERTY CONSIDERATION
Article 19. Offenses commited against to the properties and all kinds of assests of the
Administration and Fund attached to the Administration shall be considered as
offenses commited against State property. The punishments in the Turkish Penal Code
shall apply. No movable property and real estate of the Administration and of the
Fund may be seized.
EXPROPRIATION
Article 20. The Administration, the Fund, and weapons and munitions producing
enterprises of partnerships whose shares are more than half owned by the
Administration and/ or the Fund shall enjoy the provisions of the Laws and
Regulations on exploration.
Provisional Article 1. Movables and real estate of the General Directorate of Defense
Ordnance Enterprises are transfered without any requirement for action to DIDA, with
all its equipment, budget and personnel.
Provisional Article 2. Shares of the Foundations established for strengthening of
Turkish Armed Forces, at various companies, may be transfered to the Fund.
Provisional Article 3. The transfer actions foreseen in Provisional Article 1 and 2 shall
be accomplished within six months. The present implementation shall continue until
the transfer actions are accomplished. The transfer actions and all revenues resulting
from this transfer shall be exempt from all taxes, dues and fees.
Provisional Article 4. The provisions of this law shall apply to all income that must be
declared in annual, short and specific returns for 1985 income of taxpayers for income
and corporate tax as from 1 January 1986. No amount shall be computed of 1985
income and revenue, certain portions of which is withheld. Provisions of this law shall
apply for income and revenue to be withheld as from 1 January 1986.
Provisional Article 5. (Not included)
Provisional Article 6. Net Lottery revenue of 1985 of the National Lottcr}-'
Administration shall be paid to the Fund in accordance with the principles set forth at




Article 21 This Law shall come into force on the date of its publication.
Article 22 Provisions of this law shaU be implemented by the Council of Ministers.
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APPENDIX E
WEAPONS PROCURED BY SECURITY ASSISTANCE
MAJOR TURKISH WEAPONS SYSTEMS
ARMY
Equipment
Tanks: some 3,700: 900 M-47 (700 in reserve, 200 in store), 1,085




Armored Personnel Carrier (AFC): 3,750: 700 M-59, 2,250 M-113,
some 800 M-2 -3 (perhaps 300 in store).
Artillery: some 2,000.
Guns: 186 155mm, 150 M-59 towed 175mni, 36 M-107 self-propelled.
Howitzers: 75mm: 100 M-116A1;
105mm: 600 M 101A 1, 72 M- 108 self-propelled (sp)(108 M-7 sp. and 216
M-52 in store),
155mm: 144 M-44 sp. (some in store), 378 M-114A1;
203mm: 104 M-115, (81 M-55 (U.S.) sp. in store), 16 i\l-110A2 sp.
Mortars:
1,800 81mm: M-1; M-4A1 (M-2/ -3 APC) sp., Soltam M-125A1 sp.;
107mm (including 4.2 inch): M-2, M-30, M84 (M-59 APC)sp., M-106A1
sp; 120mm: 100: Soltam, TOSAM MKE HY12-DL
Anti-tank: Recoilless launcher(s): 57mm: 1,400 M-1 8; 75mm: 1,000
M-20; 106mm: 1,200+ M-40.
Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW): 85 Cobra, SS-11, TOW including
M-113 sp., Milan.
Air Defense: guns: 20mm: 300: HS-820, Mk 20 RH-202 twin; 35mm;
40mm: 900 M-lAl, L/60, M-42;75mm: M-51; 90mm: M-117/-118.
Surface-to-air missiles (SAM): Redeye, some S Rapier laynchers with 54
missiles.
Aviation:
Aircraft: 2 DHC-2 Beaver, 100 U-17 (Cessna 185), 70 O-IE, 8 Cessna
206, 20 Cessna 421, 5 Cornier Do-27, 5 Do-28, 15 Beech Baron, 5 T-42




Helicopter: 65 Agusta-bell AB-204/-205, 15 AB-206A, 20 Bell 47G. 30
Bell UH-ID, 40 UH-IH, 30 Hughes Th-55.
{On order: TOW. 1.040 Milan ATGM; 26 AH-IS Cobra (Improved
TOW) attack, 25 LTI-IH hel; Rapier SAM (some S launchers, iOS
missiles)).
Submarines: 17: 6 Type 1200; 9 U.S. Guppy (2 in reserve); 2 Tang (on
loan).
Destroyers: 13: 9 Gearing (5 with 1 octuple ASROC); 2 Carpenter; 1
Summer; 1 Smith.
Frigates: 4: 2 Berk each with I Helicopter; 2 Koln.
Fast Attack Craft (Missile) (FAC (G): 11: 6 Dogan (Lursen FPB-57)
with 2 quad Harpoon; 9 Kartal (Jaguar-Type) with 4 Penguin 2 Surface-
to-surface Missile (SSM);
Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo) FAC(T): 11:
5 S-141 Jaguar, 6 Zobel-type.
Patrol Craft: 28: 24 Large (1 Girne, 1 U.S. Asheville, 12 AB-25, 6
PC-1638, 4 PGM-71); 4 coastal 83-ft < .
Minelayers: 7: 1 Nusret, 6 coastal.
Minesweepers: 26 12 U.S. Adjutant, 4 Canadian, 6 FRG Vegesack
coastal; 4 U.S. Cape inshore;8 minehunting craft.
Amphibious: Landing Ship, Tank (LST): 7 (4 are dual-purpose
minelayers); Landing Craft, Tank (LCT): 40. Landing Craft Utility
(LCU): 13. Landing Craft Medium (LCM): 20.
Auxilary Ships: 1 Headquarter ship; 1 Destroyer tender, 1 subtender, 2
repair ships; 4 depot ships; 1 fleet, 6 support, 3 harbour tankers; 38
transportations.
Naval Aviation: 15 combat aircraft; 6 combat hehcopters.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): 1 squadron with 15 S-2A/E Tracker
aircraft; 3 Agusta-Bell AB-204B, 3 AB-212 helicopters.
(On order; 1 Type 1200 SS Diesel submarine, 4 MEKO-200 frigates, 12
LCT)
AIR FORCE:
Fighters- Ground Attack (EGA): 19 squadrons:
2 with Northop F-5A/B;
2 with F-IOOD Super Sabre;
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5 \nth McDonnell-Douglass F-4E;
10 with Lockheed F-104G;TF-104.
Fighters: 2 squadrons with F-104S,TF-104G.
Reconnaissance: 2 squadrons: 1 with F-5A, RF-5A; 1 with RF-4E.
Trasportation: 5 squadrons:
1 with C-130 Hercules;
1 with TranstallC- 160;
3 with c-47 (Douglas DC-3), Beech C-45, BAe Viscount 794 (VIP) ac;
BellUH-lH hel.
1 flight with C-47, Cessna Citation.
Liaison: 3 fits: C-47, Beech AT-11. Lockheed T-33 aircraft; UH-IH
Heiicopters;10 base fits with C-47, T-33. AT-U aircraft; UH-IH,
UH-19B (Sikorsky S-55) helicopters.
Operational Conversion Units: 5 squadrons: 2 with F-5A/B, F-104G; 2
with T-33, Northop T-38; 1 with Cessna T-37C.
Training: 3 squadrons with T-33, T-34 Beech Mentor, T-41 Cessna
Mescalero, training schools with C-47 aircraft; UH-IH Helicopters.
SAM: 8 squadrons with Nike Hercules; 2 Rapier squadrons (to have 24
launchers, 324 missiles)
Equipment: 448 combat aircraft
F-5: 91: -A: 30 (Fighter ground attack (EGA)); -B: 16 EGA; -A/B: 24
Operational Conversion Units (OCU); RF-5A: IS reconnaissance;
RF-5B: 3 reconnaissance (recce).
F-IOOD/F: 40 EGA.
F-4E: 97: 90 EGA; RF-4E: 7 recce.
F-104: 220: -D/G: 160 EGA; -S: 32 ftr.; TF-104: 28: 20 EGA, 4 ftr., 4
OCU.
C-130: 7 transportation (tpt). Transall C-160D: 20 tpt. Viscount: 3
VIP. C-47: 44+ (40 tpt, 2 VIP, 2 Base fit + communications fit,
training school aircraft) Citation: 2 VIP transportation. AT-11: 18.
Beeck 18: 2 tpt. T-33: 82, T-37: 37. T-34: 15 T-41: 30.
Helicoptc.s:
UH-IH: 15 + .
UH-19B: 5.
Missiles: SAM: 72 Nike Hercules, 24 Rapier.
(On order: 160 E-16 fighter, 18 S-2E Tracker ASW, 2 Citation II
Training aircraft, 15 AH- IS Cobra Hel., Super Sidewinder, Sparrow
AAM; AGM-65 Maverick; 24 Rapier SAM Missiles.).
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Sources: [Ref. 79], [Ref. 80], [Ref. 81], [Ref. 82], [Ref. 83], [Ref. 84],
[Ref. S5], [Ref. 86], [Ref. 87], [Ref 88], [Ref 89], [Ref 91], [Ref 92],
[Ref 93], [Ref 94], [Ref 95], [Ref 96], [Ref 97], [Ref 98].
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TABLE 4
ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY
Delivery
Date tt Item Supplier Comment
AIRCRAFT
(1951) 36 Lockeed T-33 A-N USA




(1953) beech C-45 USA
1954-56 82 Canadair CL 13 Sabre
MK 2 and MK 4 Canada
1956 3 Douglas C-54 USA
(1956) (30) Reo"blic RF-84F USA
1956-57 25 Cuaddair CL-13 Sabre
MK 4 UK
(1957-59) 200 Piper LIS Super Cub USA






(1959) NA F-86D Sabre USA MAP
(I960) (25) NA F-IOOF Super Saber USA
(1961) 23 Cessna T-37 USA Might be
from Canada









1964 5 Lockheed C-130E
Hercules
USA
1964 42 Republic F-84F FR Germany NATO Aid
surplus






1966 18 Cessna U-1 USA
1966 15 Dornier Do-27 FR Germany NATO aid
1966 5 Dornier Do-28 B-1 FR Germany NATO aid
1966 (20) Agusta-Bell 47 Italy
1966 13 Agusta-Bell 204B Italy
1966-68 75 Northrop F-5
Freedom Fighter
USA




7 Agusta-Bell 204B Italy
8 Grumman S-2 Tracker Nederlands
1967-68 (5) Bell 47G USA
1963 3 Dornier Do-27 FR Germany NATO aid
surplus
1968 18 Lockeed T-33 FR Germany NATO aid
surplus










ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY (CONT'D.)
Delivery
Date # Item Supplier Comment
1969 40 NA F-IOOC Super
Sabre
USA
1969 15 Siat 223 Flamingo FR Germany Built in Spair
(1969) 25 Northrop F-5
Freedom Fighter
USA
1971 5 Beech T-42 Baron USA MAP
1971 12 Lockeed T-33 FR Germany Ex-luftwaffe
1971 2 Dornier Do-28 FR Germany
1971-72 12 Grumman S-2 Tracker USA
1971-72 2 Grumman TS-2 USA
1971-72 20 Transtall C-160 FR Germany
1972 19 Cessna T-41 USA MAP
1972 3 Agusta-Bell 205
Iroquoris
USA








4 Cessna 206 USA For Army
2 Britten-Norman BN-2 UK
Islander
1974-76 40 F-104S Starfighter Italy, USA
(1973-77)
(1977-78)
40 F-4E Phantom USA
15 F-lOO USA
1977-78 56 AB 205 A-1 Helicopter Italy, USA
1977-78 6 AB 212 AS ASW
Helicopter
Italy, USA
1978 20 F-104G Starfighter FR Germany MAP




1977-78 32 USA Direct purch.
to circumvent
embargo on MAI
1979 40 citabria 150 H9C USA
(1978-80) 9 RF-4E Phantom USA
1979-80 3 S-2 Anti-submarine USA
1980 27 T-38 Talon USA
1930 12 G-91 training
aircraft
FR. Germany Grant aid
— 40 F-104 fighter
aircraft
Netherlands
1981 30 T-38A Talon trg.
aircraft
USA Aid





n/a 23 F-IOOD/F fighter ac. Denmark
n/a 16 C-160 trans,
aircraft
FR. Germany aid





ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY (CONT'D.)
Delivery
Date # Item Supplier Comment
n/a 12 UH-IH Helicopter USA




n/a 4 UH-IH ECM Helicopter USA
n/a 50 F-104 Starfighter ac FR. Germany




23 F-104G EGA ac Nederlands
18 F-104G FGA ac Belgium
Italyn/a 52 G-222 transportation
aircraft
n/a 35 F-4E Interceptors Egypt
1935 12 F-5 Interceptors Norway
n/a 50 CF-104 interceptor ac. Canada
n/a 15 UH-IH Helicopter
MISSILES
USA local assembly










(1960) (24) Unamicon MGR-1
Honest John
USA
1964 (300) MBB BO 810 Cobra FR Germany










(100) Nord SS.ll France
n/a Penguin naval SSM Norway
1976 200 AIM 7-E Sparrow
AAI^
Italy, USA
1977 6,520 Milan ATM FR Germany,
France
1977 n/a AGM 65-A Maverick USA
(1978) n/a TOW ATM USA
1978 33 Harpoon SSM USA
1977-73 (720) AIM 7 Sparrow
AAM
USA
n/a 258 AIM 7 Sparrow
AAM
USA
n/a 400 Sidewinder AAM USA
(1980-81)
(1980-81)
2500 Milan ATGW FR. Germany assistance
12 RGM_84A Harpoon SSM USA
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TABLE 4
ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY (CONT'D.)
1
Delivery
Date # Item Supplier Comment
n/a 750 AIM-9P3 Sidewinder AAM USA
n/a 36 Rapier SAM,Blindfire
radars
UK






1950 2 Submarine "Gur" Class USA Launched
1943-45
1950 1 Submarine rescue ship USA Launched 1946
adapted 1947




1952 1 Repair ship USA Launched 1944
1953 4 Motor launch USA ex US
1954 2 Submarine "Gur" class USA Launched
1943-45
on loan










1958 1 Submarine Gur Class USA Launched
1943-45
1958 1 Coastal Minelayer USA Completed
1958; MAP
1958 4 Coastal Minesweeper Canada









1960 2 Submarine "Gur" class USA Launched
1943-45
1961 1 Motor launch FR Germany Built
1960-61
1961 1 Boom defense vessel USA Launched I960;
procured by US
from W Germany
1964 3 Patrol boat "Akhisar"
class
USA
1964 1 Boom defense vessel France Built 1938
1965 2 Patrol boat
"Akhisar" class
USA
1965 4 Coastal minesweeper USA
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TABLE 4
ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY (CONT'D.)
Delivery
Date # Item Supplier Comment
1966-67 6 Motor Torpedo boat
Jaguar class
FR Germany Built 1966-
67; NATO aid
1967 2 Destroyer "Fletcher
class
USA Launched 1943
1967 1 Coastal minesweeper USA
1967 2 Inshore minesweeper USA
(1968) 1 Motor torpedo boat
"Jaguar" class
FR Germany NATO aid




1969 1 Submarine depot ship USA Completed
1944
NATO aid(1969) 2 Torpedo boat
Nasty class
FR Germany
1970 1 Boom defense vessel USA Completed
1952; ex-Dutch













1971-72 7 Gunboat USA New
1972 1 Submarine "Guppy II A" USA Completed
1972 1
type

















1972 1 Fleet ocean tug USA Launched 1942;
FY 1973
ship lease
1972 1 Supply ship FR Germany
1972 1 Minelayer FR Germany Former US
landing ship













ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY (CONT'D.)
Delivery
Date # Item Supplier Comment
1976 1 "Lursen" fast
missile boat
















(1950-52; 50) M-24 Chaffee It. tank USA
(1955-58 (540 M-47 Patton MBT USA
(1957-53 (100 M-41 Walker Bulldog USA
1957-53 400 M-59 APC USA
(1961-64; (140 M-48 Patton med tank USA
(1963) (100, M-113 APC USA
1964 431 M-113 APC Italy
1968-70 (24)
69
M-44 and M-52 SPH FR Germany ^fATO aid
1969-70 M-74 ARV FR Germany NATO aid;
surplus
(1969-70] 79 M-48 Patton med. tank FR Germany NATO aid
surplus
1972-73 250 M-48 Patton med. tank USA MAP
1977 n/a M-113 APC USA
(1980-81] 70 Leopard 1
medium tank
FR. Germany Military
(1980-81; 200 Renovation of M-48
medium tank
FR. Germany grant
n/a 600 M-48A5 tank conversion USA





THE U.S. MILITARY AID TO TURKEY
TABLE 5
THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY
FY 1950-FY 1986
FMS AGREEMENT S7,551,797,000
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1/ SIMULTANEOUS DELIVERY TO OUSORE AND DARCOM
(ORSAC-MC/P)
2/ CASES HANDLED IN-HOUSE
3/ CASES REFERRED TO DARCOM AND OTHER EXPERTS
4/ CASES WITH PROBLEMS OR NON-CONCURRENCES
5/ OALO INITIATES ARMY STAFFING
6/ OALO RETURNS STAFFED CASE TO DARCOM FOR PREPARATION OF
ARMY POSITION

























































Figure G.6 Technology Transfer (U.S. Air Force) [Ref. 34 : p. 13-26].
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